However praise for the CJEU should not be overblown, since the specific solutions that it put forward show a tendency toward new risks for the protection of freedom, in that they lead to the strengthening of Google’s filtering power and hamper solutions for data protection, on the one hand, and access to information, on the other.
As a private company Google was thereby given arbitral-like powers to decide which information can no longer be accessed via its search engine, that is information that is de facto no longer easily accessible to citizens for their own use or for public discourse. While a removal of a link in the search engine does not constitute censorship in the classic sense, it does, under the current conditions in the communications order, have a censorship-like effect in view of the overwhelming importance of Google’s search engine for finding information on the Internet. (…) Of all conceivable companies, a powerful one, perhaps currently most powerful one on the planet, was given censorship-like authority in the area of public discourse and the public accessibility of information.
The CJEU further strengthened this authority by providing substantive orientation in deciding on the deletion of a link, namely that the protection. of rights of personality normally takes precedence over freedom of communication, that is a guideline for determining when a link is to be removed in case of doubt. In doing so the CJEU established a rule that is highly controversial in normative terms and was never before found in EU law (or in the law of the European Convention of Human Rights).
(The judiciary and the surveillance state: general trends and German experiences în Judges as guardians of constitutionalism and human rights, ed. Elgar, 2016 pp. 122-123