Disagreement is patent, but its source almost always is obscure, buried in a large variety of unarticulated assumptions about law or art or literature or history that rarely surface and that can be explained only as the upshot of some combination of inherent taste, training, acculturation, allegiance, and habit. No wonder we speak so naturally of just „seeing” a poem or a picture one way or another: that is often and inescapably how the judgment feels. Of course, it seems arrogant to thoughtful people to insist that there is then one exclusive truth about the interpretative issue in hand, that those who do not see the statute or painting as they do are simply in error. It seems more realistic and modest to say that there is no one right interpretation but only different acceptable or responsible ones.
And yet this is exactly what we must not say if we are honest, because it is not what we believe or can believe. To repeat: (…) a judge who sends someone to jail on an interpretation of the law he believes no better than, but only different from, rival interpretation should be jailed himself.
(Interpretation in General în Justice for Hedgehogs, Harvard University Press, 2011, la pp. 150-1)