65. The Court notes at the outset that, unlike the cases of Brumărescu v. Romania ([GC], no. 28342/95, ECHR 1999‑VII), Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine (no. 48553/99, ECHR 2002‑VII) and Ryabykh v. Russia (no. 52854/99, ECHR 2003‑IX), and their progeny, the present case does not concern a situation in which a final and binding judgment was overturned in extraordinary proceedings. This is because, unlike the situations obtaining in all these cases, and in spite of the terminological similarity, review proceedings before the former Bulgarian Supreme Court were, after the reform of the CCP of 21 April 1990, not extraordinary proceedings, but part of the normal three‑instance proceedings (see Stoitchkov and Shindarov v. Bulgaria, nos. 24571/94 and 24572/94, Commission decision of 28 June 1995, Decisions and Reports 82, p. 85, at p. 94; Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 24140/94, Commission decision of 22 February 1995, unreported; Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, nos. 29221/95and 29225/95, Commission decision of 29 June 1998, unreported; Marintchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 43232/98, 8 July 2003; and Raichinov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 47579/99, 1 February 2005). This was so because (i) they were directly accessible to the litigants, (ii) were, as a rule, initiated, as in the case at hand, by the parties to the case, not by a third‑party State official, (iii) the possibility of instituting them was subject to a relatively short time‑limit, and (iv) in these proceedings the Supreme Court could, much as a court of cassation, examine whether the judgments of the courts below were contrary to the law or ill‑founded, or whether there had been a substantial breach of procedure, and had the power to quash them (see paragraphs 43‑45 above). Thus, although the Varna Regional Court’s judgment was technically regarded as final, it was in effect not such, as it could be, and, indeed, was overturned in the review proceedings.
Notă MMB: A se compara cu art. 456 CPC și art. 483 și urm. din Codul de procedură civilă și a se decide dacă recursul chiar e o cale extraordinară de atac ce ar trebui să stea alături de revizuire și contestație în anulare, și aceasta mai ales prin raportare la jurisprudența CEDO incidentă redată mai sus. Eu consider că recursul, precum e reglementat în Codul de procedură civilă, nu reprezintă o cale extraordinară de atac în sensul jurisprudenței CEDO și atunci mă întreb de ce se păstrează o atare mențiune. Adică mi se pare că art. 456 CPC este contrar realității juridice și teoriei generale de drept comparat atunci când afirmă că recursul este o cale extraordinară de atac.
Pentru partea de penal, a se compara și cu:
41. The point warrants dwelling further on the intricacies of national law. As a matter of law, it is erroneous to argue that in Portuguese law the extraordinary appeal for the reopening of a criminal case has “some features in common with an appeal on points of law”. They differ in terms of the admissibility requirements, locus standi, time-limits, formalities, the competent court, the remit of the court and the appellant’s procedural guarantees, as the Government themselves rightly pointed out. Ordinary appeals (recursos ordinários) and extraordinary appeals (recursos extraordinários) are regulated, respectively, in Title I and II of Book IX of the Criminal Procedure Code. (Opinia disidentă de aici)
Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului
(Hotărârea din 10 august 2006, Yanakiev împotriva Bulgariei, CE:ECHR:2006:0810JUD004047698)