Ne-am imaginat un loc unde Eroul să se retragă, între două cauze (acolo unde copilașii dorm)

1 octombrie 2017
286 citiri

Because we called this book a Herculean task, we spoke to a specialist on Art History and enquired about the mythical figure’s troubles. The specialist is a medical doctor versed in painting as well as music who looked to art for his own solace when he was not busy mending broken souls. We asked him how many had Hercules labours been. For a naive moment we hoped that the answer would be ten. Had it been so, we could have latched each labour to a chapter. And in that case we might have written 10 chapters instead of eight. We also asked him if at the end (of the labours) Hercules had stopped. And rested.
The doctor smiles.
‘Hercules cannot rest’, he said.

He explained how unrest is exactly what this character is about. The labours come attached to parergas, minor sequences of troubles that are endless.

Thus, when one takes up a Herculean labour one is required (as was Hercules) to conquer dust, heat, thirst and tiredness. And also to suffer cuts and bruises as well as to carry the weight of the story that must be told. Finally, there will always be more labours that will have to be dealt with.
Like case law. It never ends.

However, it does pause. If at no other moment, at least, in principle, case law enjoys a pause over the Summer Holidays.
So, after the final chapter, we imagined a halfway house for the Hero to retire, just for a fleeting moment, between one case and another.

At the end Hercules stops
Having discharged himself of so many troubling questions
Pays no heed to murmurs that there are more to come
New cases, different angles, words yet to reconcile
In the thirst of tiredness, he stops listening
Drops to his knees
Feels only an aching head
Swollen hands
Blistered feet
And folds into a shade
Where children sleep.

L. Rossi și P. Vinagre e Silva
(Epilogue in Public Access to Documents in the EU, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2017, la pp. 269-270)

Într-o lume (ca a noastră) în care nicio curte sau stat suveran nu deține un monopol real asupra violenței, singurul tribunal care (mai) rămâne este cel al minții

30 septembrie 2017

[În conștiința juridică care chiar susține că drepturile omului sunt obligatorii din punct de vedere moral, acestea decurg din cerința de a se proteja demnitatea umană. Conform acestui imperativ, există anumite rele față care orice persoană ar trebui protejată cu orice preț, în virtutea calității de membru al speciei umane. Întrebarea despre cine ar trebui să fie responsabil pentru această protecție – sau să plătească costurile – poate fi profund controversată. Dar deținerea acestor drepturi nu e gândită niciodată ca depinzând de cetățenie sau de un anume teritoriu, asta ca să nu mai vorbim de alte distincții mai incisive existente între ființele umane. Dacă legea transnațională reproduce în mod sistematic încălcările obligațiilor elementare care decurg din demnitate, atunci ea nu mai poate pretinde că ajută la impunerea drepturilor omului.
(…)
Ce rămâne din întrebarea dacă ceva încalcă sau impune respectarea unui drept este, mai presus de orice, o chestiune de judecată proprie. Uitați-vă bine la cele mai grave încălcări ale drepturilor omului la care aveți acces și decideți ce condiții sunt prea rele pentru a putea fi suportate de orice ființă umană; bazează-te pe tine însuți că le vei recunoaște atunci când le vei vedea.
Într-o lume în care nici o instanță sau stat suveran nu are un adevărat monopol asupra violenței – sau asupra răspunsului la întrebări ce privesc întinderea drepturilor absolute – singurul tribunal care mai rămâne este cel al minții. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)]

In the legal consciousness that does hold that human rights are morally binding, they flow from a demand to protect human dignity. According to this demand, there are certain evils from which every human being should be protected at all costs, by virtue of membership in the human species. The question of who should be responsible for such protections – or pay their costs – can be deeply controversial. But the command of such rights is never though to depend upon citizenship or physical location, let alone other more invidious distinctions between human beings. If transnational law systematically reproduces violations of the elementary obligations that follow from dignity, then it can no longer claim to help enforce human rights.
(…)
What remains of the question as to whether something violates or enforces a right is, above all else, a matter of one’s own judgment. Take a good look at the worst human rights violations you have access to, and decide which conditions are too evil for any human being to suffer; rely on yourself to know them when you see them.
In a world in which no court or sovereign state has a real monopoly on violence – or on answering a question about the scope of absolute rights – the only tribunal that remains is that of mind. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Itamar Mann
(Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights, 1993-2013 in Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, nr. 2, Summer 2013, la pp. 324-325 și 366)

Ca taxele, drepturile omului devin obligații care …

29 septembrie 2017

In Hirsi, the same bifurcation is subtler. The court did step in against such bifurcation but alter the facts of Hirsi to imagine another version of the same scenario.
(…)
Granted, ECtHR suggested that de facto control might be on par with de jure jurisdiction. But it is difficult to imagine that a court would hold a state conducting enforcement by proxy to be responsible for refoulement. Especially, for example, if the Italian “experts” are no longer physically present on the boat conducting enforcement and give their instructions or recommendations from afar. Like taxes, human rights become obligations that can be cleverly and legally avoided.

Itamar Mann
(Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights, 1993-2013 in Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, nr. 2, Summer 2013, la p. 366)

Statele liberale încorporează de principiu o contradicție fundamentală referitoare la libertatea de exprimare

28 septembrie 2017

Liberal states harbour a fundamental contradictions at their core. On the one hand, they cherish the right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, they insist that citizens should be treated equally and protected from discrimination and violence. States wary of social hostility may be inclined to combat forms of ‘extreme speech’. Indeed, some states have taken measures to outlaw sources of social unrest that are liable to upset, for example, the religious sensitivities of citizens by criminalizing speech through blasphemy laws, religious defamation laws or through hate speech laws. Critics of such policies respond that the only effective response to hate speech is more speech. That is, they suggest, that the ‘market place’ of ideas should be permitted to do its work: in a liberal state publicly made extreme statements will trigger sufficient counter-balancing speech to ensure that fighting words will remain just that – fighting words.

Jeroen Temperman
(Religious Hatred and International Law: The Prohibition of Incitement to Violence or Discrimination, Cambridge University Press, 2017 la p.1)

Guvernele au împins limitele hotărârilor, exploatând diferențe lingvistice subtile …

27 septembrie 2017

The Grand Chamber ruling in MSS v Belgium and Greece was a vindication of human rights, albeit one which publicized what all knew: that behind the façade of EU standards and masking device of ‘mutual recognition’ lay serious violations of human rights. It broke new legal ground in recognizing the legal vulnerability of asylum seekers and the concomitant obligations on States to avoid leaving them languishing in inhuman living conditions. And crucially, it set a standard to ensure that one European country could not return asylum seekers to another where such conditions were known to prevail, under the guise of mutual recognition. However, it was followed not with a re-think of Dublin, but with persistence in returns to other States where asylum systems were of concern, leading to much further litigation to test the scope of MSS, including before the CJEU in NS/ME and back to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Tarakhel v Switzerland. The battleground for asylum seekers’ rights took place in the interstices of the two supranational courts’ rulings. Governments pushed the limits of rulings, exploiting subtle linguistic differences between the otherwise apparently consistent judgments. The Strasbourg Grand Chamber ruling in Tarakhel reasserts the importance of assessment of the conditions in the State to which return is contemplated in each individual case. While this outcome can be seen as a vindication of the protection of the individual, De Shutter presciently warned that an individual human rights exception to mutual recognition tends to be ‘purely reactive and ad hoc, rather than proactive and systematic’. In this context, the Dublin litigation saga is telling. For all the successful and ground-breaking litigation, major institutions reforms have been lacking. The Dublin III Regulation was amended to reflect the NS/ME case law, and sets a standard to resist Dublin deportation that may not appropriately reflect human rights standards. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Cathryn Costello
(The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law, Oxford University Press, 24 decembrie 2015, la p. 323, Joint winner of the 2016 Odysseus Network Best Publication Prize)

Procurorii nu ar trebui să răspundă pentru daunele aduse unei persoane achitate atunci când …

26 septembrie 2017

Beyond disambiguation, two other remedies for individuals whose criminal prosecution terminate in acquittals should be briefly mentioned, though I shall mostly ignore them in the remainder of this chapter. Some legal jurisdictions permit acquitted defendants to recover compensation from the government for the costs of their defenses, assuming that those costs were not already borne by the government. Doing so enables the acquitted to recoup some of what might have been the heavy economic losses incurred in mounting trial defenses. Still, accused persons might have incurred other economic losses, in the form of lost jobs, ones for which such a remedy does them little good. More to the point, recouped legal expenses are unlikely, by themselves, to remove the taint of having been charged, put on trial, and having evidence of one’s criminality put on display for all to see.
Many legal jurisdictions also permit malicious prosecution lawsuits. If successful, such suits enable accused persons to demonstrate, in public setting, that they were wrongly targeted by police or prosecutors, and thus unjustifiably subjected to the ignominy of prosecution for crimes that it should have been clear to the authorities they did not commit. As a remedy for the negative consequences of incomplete prosecutions, such law-suits suffer from two substantial defects. First, there is reason to believe that they are very unlikely to succeed, in part because the courts have sought to insulate prosecutors from liability except when their conduct is egregious. This means that some, and perhaps most, of the individuals who might benefit from disambiguated verdicts will be unlikely to benefit from malicious prosecution lawsuits. Second, and more importantly, many failed prosecutions will not be malicious. Prosecutors will often act responsibly in filing charges against individuals and pursuing them through trial adjudication, even if acquittals of those individuals are the ultimate outcomes. Police and prosecutors should not be held liable for damages when they acted responsibly in arresting and charging individuals in response to clear, though perhaps not quite sufficiently convincing, evidence of criminal wrongdoing.(s.n. – M. M.-B.)

Richard L. Lippke
(Taming the Presumption of Innocence, Oxford University Press, 2016, la p. 189)

Accesul la un document se poate refuza fără ca o autoritate/curte să fie nevoită să-l citească în prealabil

25 septembrie 2017

We are all aware that it is almost unthinkable that the entire procedural arch of an access to documents litigation could unfold before our eyes without the contested documents even having been read by anyone. However, if we consider the policy’s players, one by one, it happens. In the first place, any applicant’s access to the contested documents is barred, tout court, until institutions disclose the same. After all, that is the entire point of being an applicant; persons apply for documents because they have never read (watched or heard) them beforehand.
Secondly, as discussed earlier, the institutions may choose not to examine the contested documents at all (if a presumption of harm is deemed to apply). Thirdly, and finally addressing the judicature’s role, the EU courts are empowered to order – at their discretion – measures of inquiry/organization which include the production of the contested documents, albeit for the eyes of the court only.
In sum, the applicant wants to read the contested documents but is impeded from doing so. The institutions may always read them yet are allowed not to. The judicature that holds the power to demand to see them – more often than not – does not order their production. The sum of these three conditions when they come together, confine the access litigation entirely to theory, to conjecture and to abstractness of reasoning. The main point, however – that no one reads the contested documents – is absent from the discussions of the doctrine and is hardly ever challenged in the case law. (s.n. – M. M.-B.)

L. Rossi, P. Vinagre e Silva
(Public Access to Documents in the EU, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2017, la pp. 122-123)

Dacă nu există viață după moarte, devine mai greu să crezi că poți să ai dreptate, deși înfrânt

24 septembrie 2017

[Cu câteva săptămâni în urmă, o cititoare catolică a ,,Tribunei” a scris pentru a protesta împotriva unei recenzii a domnului Charles Hamblett. Ea s-a opus observațiilor acestuia despre Sf. Teresa și despre Sf. Iosif din Copertino, sfântul care a zburat odată în jurul unei catedrale purtând un episcop în spate.
(…)
Esența scrisorii corespondentului meu este că nu contează dacă Sf. Teresa și ceilalți au zburat prin aer sau nu: ceea ce contează este că „viziunea despre lume a Sf. Teresa a schimbat cursul istoriei”. Aș accepta asta. Trăind într-o țară orientală, am dezvoltat o anumită indiferență față de miracole și știu bine că a avea deziluzii sau chiar a fi cu totul nebun este destul de compatibil cu ceea ce este numit cu ușurință un geniu. William Blake, de exemplu, a fost un nebun, în opinia mea. Ioana D’Arc era probabil nebună. Newton credea în astrologie, Strindberg credea în magie. Cu toate acestea, miracolele sfinților sunt o chestiune minoră.
(…)
Dar ceea ce știu este că credința în viața după moarte (…) este cu mult mai puțin răspândită decât a fost. Probabil că este în declin chiar și printre creștinii care profesează; alți oameni, ca regulă, nici măcar nu iau în considerare posibilitatea ca aceasta să fie adevărată. Dar strămoșii noștri, din câte știm, au crezut în ea. În afară de cazul în care tot ce au scris despre aceasta a avut menirea de a ne induce în eroare, ei au crezut în aceasta într-un mod extrem de literal și concret.Viața de pe pământ, după cum au văzut-o ei, a fost numai o scurtă perioadă de pregătire pentru o viață infinit mai importantă dincolo de mormânt. Dar această credință a dispărut, ori dispare, iar consecințele nu au fost cu adevărat înfruntate.
Civilizația occidentală, spre deosebire de unele civilizații orientale, a fost fondată parțial pe credința în nemurirea individului. Dacă privim religia creștină din afară, această credință în imortalitate pare mult mai importantă decât credința în Dumnezeu. Concepția occidentală despre bine și rău este foarte dificil de separat de ea. Fără îndoială, cultul modern al închinării în fața puterii este legat de sentimentul omului modern că viața de aici și acum este singura viață care există. Dacă moartea pune capăt la tot, devine mult mai greu să crezi că poți avea dreptate, chiar dacă ești învins. Oamenii de stat, națiunile, teoriile, cauzele sunt judecate aproape inevitabil prin prisma testului succesului material. Presupunând că cele două fenomene pot fi separate, aș spune că decăderea credinței în nemurirea proprie a fost la fel de importantă ca și creșterea civilizației industriale.
(…)
Nu vreau să se întoarcă credința în viața de după moarte și, în orice caz, nu este probabil să se întoarcă. Ceea ce vreau să subliniez este că dispariția ei a lăsat un mare gol și că ar trebui să fim atenți la acest lucru. Construit de mii de ani pe ideea că omul supraviețuiește, el trebuie să facă un efort psihologic considerabil pentru a se obișnui cu ideea că omul piere. Nu este probabil ca el să salveze civilizația decât dacă poate dezvolta un sistem de bine și rău care este independent de rai și iad.
(…)
Socialismul a stabilit: vom fi mai fericiți într-un sens material, presupunând că toate problemele dispar când burta este plină. Dar adevărul este opusul: când burta este goală, singura problemă este o burta goală. Când ne vom îndepărta de corvoadă și de exploatare, vom începe cu adevărat să ne întrebăm despre destinul omului și despre motivul existenței sale. Nu putem avea nicio imagine valoroasă a viitorului decât dacă ne dăm seama cât de mult am pierdut prin decăderea creștinismului.Puțini socialiști par să fie conștienți de acest lucru. Iar intelectualii catolici, care se agață de litera Crezurilor, în timp ce citesc în ele sensuri pe care nu trebuiau să le aibă niciodată, și care râd de cineva suficient de simplu să presupună că Părinții Bisericii au crezut ceea ce ei afirmă, doar ridică perdele de fum pentru a ascunde  de ei înșiși propria lor necredință. – traducere de av. Constantin Matei]

Some weeks ago a Catholic reader of Tribune wrote to protest against a review by Mr. Charles Hamblett. She objected to his remarks about St. Teresa, and about St. Joseph of Copertino, the saint who once flew round a cathedral carrying a bishop on his back.
(…)
The substance of my correspondent’s letter is that it doesn’t matter whether St. Teresa and the rest of them flew through the air or not: what matters is that St. Teresa’s „vision of the world changed the course of history”. I would concede this. Having lived in an Oriental country I have developed a certain indifference to miracles, and I well know that having desilusions, or even being an outright lunatic, is quite compatible with what is loosely called a genius. William Blake, for instance, was a lunatic in my opinion. Joan of Arc was probably a lunatic. Newton believed in astrology, Strindberg believed in magic. However, the miracles of the saints are a minor matter.
(…)
But what I do know is that belief in survival after death (…) is enourmously less widespread than it was. Even among professing Christians it is probably decaying; other people, as a rule, don’t even entertain the possibility that it might be true. But our forefathers, so far as we know, did believe in it. Unless all that they wrote about it was intended to mislead us, they believed in it in an exceedingly literal, concrete way. Life on earth, as they saw it, was simply a short period of preparation for an infinitely more important life beyond the grave. But that notion has disappeared, or is disappearing, and the consequences have not really been faced.
Western civilisation, unlike some Oriental civilisations, was founded partly on the belief in individual immortality. If one looks at the Christian religion from the outside, this belief appears far more important than the belief in God. The Western conception of good and evil is very difficult to separate from it. There is little doubt that the modern cult of power-worship is bound up with the modern man’s feeling that life here and now is the only life there is. If death ends everything, it becomes much harder to believe that you can be in the right if you are defeated. Statesmen, nations, theories, causes are judged almost inevitably by the test of material success. Supposing that one can separate the two phenomena, I would say that the decay of the belief in personal immortality has been as important as the rise of machine civilisation.
(…)
I do not want the belief in life after death to return, and in any case it is not likely to return. What I do point out is that its disappearance has left a big hole, and that we ought to take notice of that fact. Reared for thousands of years on the notion that the individual survives, man has got to make a considerable psychological effort to get used to the notion that the individual perishes. He is not likely to salvage civilisation unless he can evolve a system of good and evil which is independent of heaven and hell.
(…)
Socialism has been established we shall be happier in a material sense, and to assume that all problems lapse when one’s belly is full. But the truth is the opposite: when one’s belly is empty, one’s only problem is an empty belly. It is when we have got away from drudgery and exploitation that we shall really start wondering about man’s destiny and the reason for his existence. One cannot have any worthwhile picture of the future unless one realises how much we have lost by the decay of Christianity. Few Socialists seem to be aware of this. And the Catholic intellectuals who cling to the letter of the Creeds while reading into them meanings they were never meant to have, and who snigger at anyone simple enough to suppose that the Fathers of the Church meant what they said, are simply raising smokescreens to conceal their own disbelief from themselves. (s.n. – M. M.-B.)

George Orwell
(As I Please 14 publicat în Tribune, 3 martie 1944, preluat în Essays (selecție de J. Carey), Everyman’s Library, 2002, la pp. 555-558)

In Capitolul 3 vom observa rolul opiniilor disidente în determinarea schimbării (jurisprudenței)

23 septembrie 2017

In addition, for example, in Article 8 ECHR case law examined in Chapter 3, we see the role of dissenting judgments in prompting change, leading gradually to the recognition that all settled migrants have a privacy right to remain in their host country (nota de subsol are următorul conținut: Judge Martens’ dissenting opinion in Beldjoudi v France (1992) and Boughanemi v France (1996). The ECtHR finally adopted this position in Uner v The Netherlands (2007). (s.n. – M. M.-B.)

Cathryn Costello
(The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law, Oxford University Press, 24 decembrie 2015, la p. 60, Joint winner of the 2016 Odysseus Network Best Publication Prize)

Standardul minim de protecție conferit de CEDO prezintă un anumit grad de mobilitate și …

22 septembrie 2017

I start from the assumption that the purpose of the Convention, as a tool for strengthening democracy in a region, is to consolidate a „minimum” standard of formal and substantive quality in protecting the Convention rights. This minimum is, notwithstanding, not determined in the abstract, and it is conditioned by an incrementalist rationale. Consequently, the minimal standard of protection has a certain degree of mobility and its outlines continuously depend on the balance between democracy and rights (cu trimitere la Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 48(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1999) (s.n. – M. M.-B.).

Marisa Iglesias Vila
(Subsidiarity, margin of appreciation and international adjudication within a cooperative conception of human rights, I*CON, vol. 15, no. 2, 2017, pp. 393-413, la p. 408)