311 citiri

Where relevant, applicants may be required to bring domestic proceedings based on EU law, including allowing for the possibility of the domestic court requesting a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as regards the compatibility of the domestic law with EU law, given that such a ruling by the CJEU is binding on the referring national court as to the interpretation of the EU law rule in question (cu trimitere la Laurus Invest Hungary Kft and others v Hungary, dec. 8.9.15)(s.n. – M.M.-B.).

Philip Leach
(Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, octombrie 2017, la pp. 150-1)

An applicant should raise in domestic proceedings the substance of the complaint to be made to the Court on the basis that the domestic courts should have the opportunity to decide on a claim before it is considered by the European Court.
(…)
The applicant in Azinas v Cyprus was found by the Grand Chamber (at the ‘merits stage’) not to have exhausted domestic remedies because he had failed to invoke Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 before the Supreme Court, even though it was directly applicable in the Cypriot legal system.

Philip Leach
(Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, octombrie 2017, la p. 143-144)

It follows that the national legal orders must ensure that there is a remedy which either ensures that excessive delays are avoided, or provide redress where such delays arise.
(…)
In McFarlane v Ireland, the Irish Government argued that the Court’s previous judgment in Barry v Ireland was incorrect in concluding that an action for damages for a breach of the constitutional right to reasonable expedition did not constitute an effective remedy for delay in criminal proceedings. The Grand Chamber rejected this argument by identifying a number of matters which would cast some doubt on the effectiveness of this proposed remedy. First, there is, in the Court’s view, significant uncertainty as to the availability of the proposed constitutional remedy. Secondly, the Court considered that it was not demonstrated that this action could constitute a remedy as regards a judge’s delay in delivering a judgment. The Government had accepted that there was likely to be an exception to the right to damages for a breach of a constitutional rights when the delay was caused by the failure of an individual judges to deliver judgment within a reasonable time, given the important and established principle of judicial immunity. Since the Court holds a State responsible under the ‘reasonable time’ aspect of Article 6(1) for delay by judges in delivering their judgments, any remedy which does not apply to this form of delay cannot be considered an effective one within the meaning of Article 13. Thirdly, the proposed constitutional remedy would form part of the High and Supreme Court body of civil litigation for which no specific and streamlined procedures had been developed. One consequence of this was that the speed of the remedial action may be too slow to be effective. A second consequence concerned the legal costs and expenses burden the remedial action could impose. Overall, therefore, the Grand Chamber did not regard the possibility of an action for damages for a breach of the constitutional right to reasonable expedition as an effective remedy under Article 13.

.
B. Rainey, E. Wicks, C. Ovey
(Jacobs, White, and Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press, ediția a 7 a, data apariției: 14 septembrie 2017, la pp. 145-6)

Money laundering is by definition based on another crime termed a predicate offence, which gives rise to the laundering in question. In this respect, it should, however, be observed that there is an on-going debate in legal doctrine about the need to have a general definition of predicate offences in order to meet the legality requirement of strict construction in criminal law (cu trimitere la J. Handoll, Capital Payments and Money Laundering in the European Union (London, Richmond, 2006).
(…)
In any case, the term „money laundering” is rather misleading as it not only concerns money, but also ‘grey’ property of virtually any kind, which is covered and embraces a continuum of economic acctivity where the moral culpability associated with money laundering activity varies as one moves along this scale. The main problem in this respect has been that the criminalised area at issue has been rather imprecise. For example, the UK includes a prohibition on insider dealing in its anti-money laundering legislation while most other Member States do not.
The 2005 Directive attempts to solve the problem of ill-defined legislation.

Ester Herlin-Karnell
(The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law, ed. Hart, 2012, la pp. 149)

Le droit pénal moderne s’est construit sur des exigences de justice dégagées par les Lumières à la fin du XVIIIe siècle. Il subsiste un lien très profond entre cette première génération de droits de l’homme et les principes au fondement de notre système répressif.
En effet, dans une société démocratique, le droit penal a principalement, si ce n’est exclusivement, pour fonction de contenir la force de réaction de l’État face à des comportements qui, par leur gravité ou leur nombre, semblent menacer l’ordre que cet État défend. Dans cette perspective, la fonction du droit penal n’est pas de donner à l’État les moyens de lutter contre la criminalité et la délinquance. Ces moyens, il les a par nature, par definition meme des lors qu’il est ‘État’. Il se définit notamment à travers eux. Les termes sont là pour le rappeler. C’est la „force” ou la „puissance” publique qui intervient. La répression relève de ce registre-là, celui d’un réflexe de survie de la part d’un État qui trouve et conserve sa légitimité en organisant la sanction des comportements troublant le plus gravement l’ordre public. Dans une société démocratique, la particularité tient au fait que le droit s’oppose à la force. Le droit penal permet alors de réguler, d’encadrer le pouvoir de répression de l’État. Le principe de légalité des délits et des peines, sans le respect duquel la démocratie est en peril, remplit d’abord et avant tout cette fonction. Il en va de même pour l’exigence de nécessité des peines, le respect de la présomption d’innocence et des droits de la défense.

Emmanuel Dreyer
(Quels droits de l’homme au fondement du droit pénal? în Droit répressif au pluriel : droit interne, droit international, droit européen, droits de l’homme, Liber amicorum en l’honneur de Renée Koering-Joulin, 2015, Anthemis, la pp. 177-8)

120. Hannah Arend către Martin Heidegger, New York, 12 martie 1970

Dragă Martin,

De mult voiam să-ți scriu și să-ți mulțumesc pentru minunatele lucruri trimise. Și de multe ori ți-am scris în minte lungi scrisori – mult prea lungi pentru a fi transcrise pe hârtie, numai și din simplu motiv că, pentru a o face, trebuie să mă deplasez de la locul meu de meditație (de pe sofa sau de pe balansoar) până la mașina de scris. Iar când scrii astfel de scrisori lungi în care exprimi gândurile și recunoștința e greu să te întrerupi.
(…)
În ianuarie am fost la Chicago să țin câteva conferințe, urmate de seminare – a fost foarte bine. Am întâlnit un cerc de oameni surprinzători de plăcuți, inteligenți și deschiși.
(…) Acestor tinere talente le vine greu să reflecteze serios la acele probleme feminine pe care mișcarea feministă le-a dat cu totul peste cap, și le este cu atât mai greu cu cât nu sunt dispuse să o facă. Aici a început iarăși absurditatea legată de mișcarea de emancipare, iar studentele au ajuns să te întrebe ce trebuie făcut ca să fii iubită de bărbați. Dacă le spui „să gătești bine”, „munca nu te dezonorează” etc., rămân stupefiate.
(…)
Ca întotdeauna,
Hannah

Hannah Arend
(Scrisori. 1925-1975 (trad. C. Pleșu, C. Cioabă), ed. Humanitas, București, 2017, a doua ediție, la pp. 222-4)

In Kleinwort Benson, Lord Goff opined that the retroactive effect of judicial decisions was inevitable. He added that:

The only alternative, as I see it, is to adopt a system of prospective overruling. But such a system, although it has occasionally been adopted elsewhere with, I understand, somewhat controversial results, has no place in our legal system.

Lord Hope expressed exactly the contrary view when he proposed that prospective overruling take place in Hall v Simons. That case changed the law so that advocates were no longer immune from being sued for negligence. No other member of the House in that case discussed prospective overruling, and so the abolition of advocates’ immunity had the ordinary retroactive effect. It applied to any causes of action arising prior to the announcement of the abolition that were not already res judicata and had not expired by force of the statute of limitations.
(…)
Litigants have, however, requested that the temporal effect of judgments in the United Kingdom be controlled in others ways. In Ahmed v HM Treasury, the Supreme Court struck down Executive Orders designed to prevent the financing of acts of terrorism on the basis that they were ultra vires the statute under which they were issued.
Restrictions placed on individuals under the Orders were thus ‘imposed without authority and are of no effect in law’. They were void ab initio. The Treasury asked the Supreme Court to suspend its orders so that restrictions placed by banks on the funds of the individuals concerned would ‘persist until the invalid restrictions can be replacedby restrictions that have the force of law’.
It is clear that the United Kingdom has the power to suspend the effect of its orders if it sees fit to do so. It is equally clear that this is not a form of prospective overruling, but only a delay in the taking effect of a judgment, which, once it has taken effect, will apply to the facts that gave rise to it and to all cases decided from then on regardless of when the facts giving rise to them occurred, subject to any legislative intervention in the meantime. Lord Hope thought that the Supreme Court should suspend the effect of its orders in this case, but the rest of the court disagreed, holding that ‘it would not be appropriate to suspend any part of the court’s order’ because: ‘This could should not lend itself to a procedure that is designed to obfuscate the effect of its judgment’. The Executive Orders were ultra vires and so, the court considered, they should be struck down without delay.

Ben Juratowich
(The Temporal Effect of Judgemnts in the United Kingdom în The Effect of Judicial Decisions in Time, Intersentia, 2014, la pp. 168-70)

The world is dark. We look to the horizon
Reflections of the sunset yesterday
‘Cause man is in a state of loss, subjected to an evil force
It hurts so bad, the Sun has stopped to pray

An old man is in another world crying
To see his soul reborn in misery
Where wrong is made to seem alright
Where peaceful man is forced to fight
Where mirrors are the source of light to see.

Gil Scott-Heron, Victor Brown
(Western Sunrise în interpretarea lui Charenee Wade)

The QPC breaks with the long-standing French tradition of légicentrisme (i.e. the sacred, hence intangible character of the laws being the expression of Rousseau’s general will) and fosters the common view that the Constitution is actually at the apex of the legal system. (…) With this new procedure, which significantly enhanced the rule of law in France, arose the issue of the ratione temporis application of the Conseil constitutionnel’s decisions. Should statutes still have some effects after they have been declared unconstitutional and repealed? And what about their past effects prior to the decision or to the abrogation?

François-Xavier Millet
(Temporal Effects of Judicial Decisions in France în The Effect of Judicial Decisions in Time, Intersentia, 2014, la p. 112)

In one other case, on the technique of surveillance in criminal proceedings, the Court of Cassation also considered the legitimate expectations of society concerning legal norms and the obligatory demands of legal certainty. The Court decided that these two principles were not violated by the retroactive effect of the preliminary ruling. Despite the fact that the preliminary ruling occurred one year after the case in point originated, the plaintiff should have known that the Constitutional Court would declare the legislative lacuna unconstitutional. The Court based this consideration on the number of preliminary references regarding this article pending before the Constitutional Court (cu trimitere la Cass 9 iunie 2009, AR P090054N).

Sarah Verstraelen
(The Interplay of Temporal Effects of Judicial Decisions within the Belgian Legal Order în The Effect of Judicial Decisions in Time, Intersentia, 2014, la p. 51)