Pierderile financiare, corupția din mediul privat și articolul 266 din Codul penal german

18 iulie 2018
264 citiri

VI. Vermögensschaden
(…)
6. Einzelfragen.
(…)
c) Korruption, insbesondere Kick-back und Drittmitteleinwerbung.
aa) Schmiergeldzahlungen.
Schmiergeldzahlungen können tatbestandlos sein, wenn sie vom Dürfen im Innenverhältnis gedeckt sind. Einzelheiten sind hier bereichsabhängig und können bei privaten Vermögensinhaben anders zu beurteilen sein als bei juristischen Personen. Soweit die Zahlung einer Bestechungssumme, etwa zur Erlangung eines lukrativen Auftrags, nach Maßgabe des Innenvrhältnisses pflichtwidrig ist, ist sie grds. auch als untaugliches Mittel zur Errechung einer den zu betreuenden Vermögensinteressen entrsprechenden Zwecksetzung anzusehen. Nach wirtschaftlicher Betrachtung soll ein Schaden dann zu verneinen sein, wenn die Chance, auf die unlautere Weise zum Ziel zu gelangen, wirtschaftlich wertvoller ist als das hingegebene Geld. Diese Bewertungsmaßtabe konnen allerdings nur als unklar bezeichnet werden, da die Aufdeckung einer Korruption dem (wirtschaftlich relevanten) „good will” eines Unternehmens kaum forderlich sein dürfte. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Urs Kindhäuser
(Strafgesetzbuch (Kindhauser, Neumann, Paeffgen, coord.) vol.3, ed. Nomos, editia a cincea, 2017, la pp. 926-927)

Deciziile luate într-o companie privată ca element constitutiv al infracțiunii prevăzute la articolul 266 din Codul penal german

17 iulie 2018

IV. Der allgemeine Treubruchstatbestand (Abs. 1 Alt. 2)
(…)

4.Risikogeschäfte.
(…)
c)Unternemhrische Entscheidungen.

Bei der Beurteilung einter unternehmerischen Entscheidung – zB eines AG-Vostandes oder eines GmBH-Geschäftsführers – ist den Entscheidungsträgern nach ursprünglich zum Aktienrecht entwickelten Grundsätzen ein weiter unternehmenrischer Spielraum einzuräumen, ohne den eine Unternehmerische Tätigkeit schlechterdings nicht denkbar ist. Eine Entscheidung liegt erst dann nicht mehr innerhalb dieses Spielraums „[…] wenn die Grenzen, in denen sicht ein von Verantwortungsbewusstsein getragenes, ausschließlich am Unternehnsenswohl orientiertes, auf sorgfältiger Ermittlung der Entscheidungsgrundlagen beruhendes unternehmerisches Handeln bewegen muss, nich überschritten sind, die Bereitschfat unternehmerische Risiken einzugehen, in unverantwortlicher Weise überspannt wird oder das Verhalten des Vorstands aus anderen Gründen als pflichtwidrig gelten muss”. Die Grenzen des unternehmerischen Handelns werden hierbei wesentlisch von den enschlägigen zivil – und gesellshchaftsrechtlichen Normen bestimmt, was zu einer bedenklichen Weite des Untreuetatbestandes führen kann. Eine Einschränkung soll hier nach einigen Judikaten dadurch erreich werden, dass man bei risikobehafteten uternehmerischen Entscheidungen nicht jeden Verstoß gegen zivil- und gesellschaftsrechtliche Pflichten für eine Verletzung der Vermögensbetreuungspflicht iSv §266 ausreichen lässt, sondern eine gravierende Pflichtverletzung fordert, die anhand einer Gesamtschau der gesellschafts- bzw zivilrechtlinchen Kriterien zu bestimmen ist. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Urs Kindhäuser
(Strafgesetzbuch (Kindhauser, Neumann, Paeffgen, coord.) vol.3, ed. Nomos, editia a cincea, 2017, la pp. 909-910)

Infracțiunea prevăzută de art. 266 din Codul penal german este înfăptuită în proporție de 0.2% de persoane sub 18 ani și în proporție de 7.5% de cetățeni străini

16 iulie 2018

IV. Kriminologie
Im Vergleich zu Diebstahl und Betrug spielt die Untreue in der Kriminalstatistik nur eine untergeordnete Rolle; erfasst werden in Deutschland pro Jahr mehr als 8.000 Fälle mit einem Anteil von ca. 0,14% an der Gesamtkriminalität. Die Aufklärungsquote beträgt ca. 98,1%; das Dunkelfeld dürfte aber wegen der – ZB aus Imagegrunden – nur geringen Anzeigebereitschaft (oder Unkenntnis) der Opfer beträchtlich sein. Der Täterkreis besteht zu ca. 69.2% aus Männern; 0,2, der Tatverdächtigen sind weniger als 18 Jahr alt; der Anteil des Ausländer beläuft sich auf 7,5%. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Urs Kindhäuser
(Strafgesetzbuch (Kindhauser, Neumann, Paeffgen, coord.) vol.3, ed. Nomos, editia a cincea, 2017, la p. 888)

Controlul de constituționalitate reprezintă tot timpul o intervenție în politică

14 iulie 2018

When a court corrects the legislature in respect to its attempt to balance freedom and security, it is intervening in politics. But that always occurs in connection with judicial review by constitutional courts. Even a decision that does not overturn a law as unconstititutional has political implications.

Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem
(The Judiciary and the Surveillance State: general trends and German experiences în Judges as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights (coord. M. Scheinin, H. Krunke, M. Aksenova), ed. Elgar, la p. 134)

Kant despre o federație a statelor și libertate

12 iulie 2018

Before discussing Kant’s view on how one is forced to join a state and the version of hypothetical social contract theory toward which these concerns lead Kant, it is interesting to consider the relationship between Kant’s argument for the necessity of the state and his views on international relations. Kant has argued that people who remain in proximity, and in the natural condition relative to others, because they necessarily interfere with the freedom of those others, may therefore justly be forced to join together with them in a state that secures their freedom. However, what if these people are already members of a state, but a different neighboring state? Two related problems arise: First, the members of each state interfere with the freedom of the members of the other state just as they would if they were not members of a state at all; if there is no formal relationship between the states, there is no guarantee that the members of each state will respect the rights of the members of the other state. Second, the two states, which can each be thought of as a “moral person” , are in the state of nature relative to one another, and suffer all the difficulties that let Kant to argue for the need for civil society.

Kant recognizes that these are serious difficulties which, unchecked, would very much undermine the possibility of the sort of human development that he thinks should be facilitated. His solution to the problem is to suggest that the same forces that lead individuals into a state should lead states into a federation of states . This federation of states would then fulfill the same role among states that a state fulfills for its citizens, and would also provide the necessary guarantee of external freedom among the citizens of different states.

Although it is clear what Kant provides through his suggestion of a federation of states, there is also a significant problem raised by this suggestion: Who is ultimately sovereign? Since Kant argues that for a state effectively to fulfill its role it must be ruled by an absolute sovereign, it would seem to follow that the federation of states can effectively fulfill its role only if it is ruled by an absolute sovereign. Thus, it appears to be a clear implication of Kant’s argument that there should be a single world nation, without lesser sovereign states. However, Kant never supports the notion of a single world state, and at one point discusses the concern that such a world state “may lead to the most fearful despotism”. Thus, while Kant was right to recognise that his argument for the necessity and the legitimacy of the state has important implications for international relations, he was never able to give a clear and satisfactory account of how those international relations should be organized.

Don Becker
(Kant’s moral and political philosophy în The Age of German Idealism (coord. R. Solomon, K. Higgins), Rougledge History of Philosophy, vol. 6, prima editie 1993, la pp. 94-95)

Instanțele naționale pot fi văzute zilnic ocupate cu interpretarea dreptului național astfel încât să fie în conformitate cu Tratatele UE

12 iulie 2018

But despite such problems, one should not lose sight of the fact that – in the great majority of situations – the system of decentralised enforcement for Union law works incredibly well: national courts all across the Member States are daily busy at work interpreting national law so as to conform to the Treaties, recognising the direct effect of myriad instruments of Union law, and disapplying irreconcilable provisions of domestic legislation.

A. Dashwood, M. Dougan, B. Rodger, E. Spaventa, D. Wyatt
(European Union Law, Hart Publishing, editia a sasea, 2011, la p. 284)

Avocatul este primul apărător al Convenției Europene a Drepturilor Omului

10 iulie 2018

L’avocat a un rôle essentiel dans la protection des droits et libertés de la Convention au niveau national. (…) Si, comme on le dit souvent, le juge national est le premier juge de la Convention, l’avocat est aussi le premier défenseur de la Convention. Plus fondamentalement, aussi bien en matière civile qu’en matière pénale, l’assistance d’un avocat qui assure l’accès effectif à un juge est un élément/une composante du droit au procès équitable garanti par l’article 6 de la Convention.
(…)
C’est parce que l’avocat est un acteur indispensable du respect des droits de l’homme que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme lui confère un ‘statut spécifique’, distinct des autres professions libérales, qui lui permet de mener à bien sa mission.

Françoise Tulkens
(Quel rôle pour les avocats devant la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme? în I diritti dell’Uomo, nr. 1, anul 2017, pp. 7-16, la pp. 8-9)

… din acel moment veți fi robii lui Phalaris

9 iulie 2018

Fabula, în schimb, este, de pildă, cea a lui Stesichoros despre Phalaris și cea a lui Esop în apărarea demagogului. Căci Stesichoros, după ce locuitorii din Himera îl aleseseră pe Phalaris ca strateg cu puteri depline și erau pe punctul de a-i oferi o gardă de corp, explicând în prealabil alte chestiuni, le-a spus acestora o fabulă: un cal ocupa de unul singur o pajiște, însă, după ce a venit un cerb și i-a distrus pășunea, voind să se răzbune pe cerb, îl întreba pe un om dacă ar putea împreună cu el să îl pedepsească pe cerb, iar omul a spus “da”, cu condiția să accepte un frâu și el însuși să îl încalece purtând săgețile; calul consimțând și omul suindu-se, în loc de a se răzbuna, el însuși i-a fost sclav omului. “La fel și voi”, zise, “luați seama ca, dorind să vă răzbunați pe dușmani, să nu îndurați același lucru, precum calul: căci aveți deja frâul, de vreme ce ați ales un strateg cu puteri depline; în schimb, dacă îi oferiți o gardă și îi permiteți să vă încalece, din acel moment veți fi robii lui Phalaris”. Pe de altă parte, Esop, vorbind înaintea poporului în Samos, pe când un demagog era judecat pentru o fărădelege capitală, zise că o vulpe, traversând un râu, a fost împinsă într-o râpă, dar neputând să iasă, a suferit rău vreme îndelungată și se țineau de ea multe căpușe, însă, un arici, ce rătăcea, de cum a văzut-o, înduioșându-se, o întrebă dacă i-ar putea înlătura căpușele, dar aceasta nu îl lăsă; întrebând-o din ce cauză, ea spuse “acestea sunt sătule de mine și îmi iau puțin sânge, în schimb, dacă mi le-ai îndepărta, altele venind înfometate, îmi vor bea până la ultima picătură sângele rămas”. “Ei bine, si voi, o, bărbați samieni, acest om în cauză nu vă va mai face rău (căci este bogat), în schimb, dacă îl veți condamna la moarte, alții vor sosi, săraci, care vă vor cheltui, furând, restul de bunuri” (notă MMB – nu înțeleg de ce Esop nu ia în considerare avariția, adică posibilitatea ca bogatul să tot vrea să fie și mai bogat (- deci diferit de căpușele deja sătule, și deci să aibă nevoie de un psiholog pentru a se trata față de acest comportament de dependență), și nici faptul că e posibil ca cel care ar urma să vină ar putea să fie nu numai sărac, ci și bogat (adică fix căpușele deja sătule) – ca atare, atenție că fabulele pot conține erori logice prin inserarea indirectă de prezumții absolute eronate conducând astfel la manipulare prin povestire subtilă și prin analogii ce sunt totuși eronate).

Aristotel
(Retorica (trad. Maria-Cristina Andrieș,Univers Enciclopedic Gold, București, 2011, II, 20, 1393-b-1394 a, la p. 245-255)

În jurisprudența sa, CEDO a stabilit numai un standard foarte general în ceea ce privește independența puterii judiciare față de celelalte puteri

8 iulie 2018

In the case law, the ECtHR has only set a very general standard for the independence of the judiciary from the other powers of government. As already noted, it has emphasized that the repartion of powers doctrine does not require states to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers’ interaction (nota de subsol 282 cu trimitere, printre altele, la Sacilor Lormines v France, paragr. 71). The Court also stated that the separation of powers is not decisive in the abstract.

Geranne Lautenbach
(The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2013, la p. 165)

Oamenii nu pot fi forțați să adopte/respecte principii (ce poate fi supus legiferării, și ce nu poate fi suspus legiferării după Kant)

6 iulie 2018

Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals addresses the issue of how the categorical imperative is to be applied by human beings. This work is divided into two parts: the „Doctrine of Right”, in which Kant expressed much of his political philosophy, and the „Doctrine of Virtue”, which is concerned exclusively with other aspects of his moral philosophy. Ostensively, the basis for Kant’s division of work is the difference between duties of justice, juridical (legal) duties, and duties of virtue, ethical duties. Kant says that all legislation (juridical and ethical) consists of two elements: the law, and the incentive to obey the law.
Although two different types of legislation may agree about the law, e.g. both juridical and ethical legislation may prohibit murder, they can at the same time differ with respect to their incentive:

If legislation makes an action a duty and at the same time makes this duty the incentive, it is ethical. If it does not include the latter condition in the law and therefore admits an incentive other than the Idea of duty itself, it is juridica. (MM, p. 19)

Kant is distinguishing ethics, according to which one must always do one’s duty exactly because it is one’s duty, and never for any other reason, from jurisprudence, according to which one can have some other incentive for one’s actions that fulfill one’s duties. In fact, Kant begins the „Doctrine of Right” by defining jurisprudence as „the body of those laws that are susceptible of being made into external laws, that is, externally legislated” (MM, p. 33). Thus, one must determine exactly what laws can be externally legislated.
First we should consider the difference between perfect and imperfect duties, and whether the laws that correspond with each of these can be externally legislated. Perfect duties require the performance or nonperformance of specific actions. It is easy to imagine how laws corresponding to these duties could be externally legislated, as it is easy to imagine how external incentives could be employed to coerce people either to perform or to refrain from performing specific actions.
It seems impossible, however, for external incentives to be employed to coerce people to perform imperfect duties (MM, p.45). After all, imperfect duties require people to adopt certain principles (e.g. beneficience), and to act on those principles in circumstances that they deem appropriate. But people cannot be coerced either to adopt principles or to act on them. Since people’s wills are always free, and adopting a principle is an act of will, people cannot be forced to adopt principles. Furthermore, although people can be coerced to perform acts that follow from specified principles, since the act is merely a response to the coercion, it cannot be construed as an attempt to act in accord with the specified principle. Thus, people cannot be forced to act on a principle. Therefore, only imperfect duties can be subject matter of jurisprudence, imperfect duties cannot.
It might appear, then, that all perfect duties can be addressed by jurisprudence. Actually, however, there is good reason to believe that Kant means to exclude perfect duties to oneself from the domain of jurisprudence. One clear statement to this effect follows: „The concept of justice … applies only to the external and – what is more – practical relationship of one person to another„(MM, p. 34).

Don Becker
(Kant’s moral and political philosophy in The Age of German Idealism (coord. R. C. Solomon, K. M. Higgins), Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 6, 2003, la pp. 83-84)