În Germania, interceptarea comunicaților trebuie să respecte un spațiu inviolabil de confidențialitate. Cu toate acestea, …

9 noiembrie 2018
209 citiri

[În plus, interceptarea telecomunicațiilor trebuie să respecte un spațiu inviolabil de confidențialitate, protejarea căruia rezultă din supremația constituțională a demnității umane. Fiecare persoană trebuie să aibă posibilitatea de a se exprima fără teama de a fi monitorizată de instituțiile guvernamentale: această exprimare include aspecte precum sentimente și simțiri, reflecții, opinii și experiențe de natură strict personală. Acest domeniu de bază al confidențialității este considerat absolut inviolabil. Nici interesele publice substanțiale nu pot justifica o încălcare. Cu toate acestea, sunt interzise numai astfel de măsuri de investigare care fac posibilă captarea informațiilor protejate necondiționat. Obținerea unui astfel de conținut de comunicare prin alte modalități conduce doar la interzicerea utilizării acestuia. Astfel, comunicarea este protejată atunci când are loc între persoane între care există o relație specială de încredere în sfera acestui domeniu de bază. Acest lucru se poate referi la membrii familiei sau la alți prieteni foarte apropiați. Cu toate acestea, această protecție este acordată numai atâta timp cât nu există indicii concrete că conținutul așteptat al conversației va prezenta o legătură imediată cu o faptă penală.

(…)

Cu toate acestea, în practică nu vor exista aproape niciodată cazuri în care se anticipează că măsurile vor furniza exclusiv informații din spațiul inviolabil. Astfel, Curtea Constituțională Federală consideră că, în multe cazuri, este inevitabil ca autoritățile de anchetă să ia act de informațiile respective în timpul interceptării telecomunicațiilor, înainte ca aceste autorități să poată recunoaște conexiunea cu zona inviolabilă; în aceste cazuri, Constituția nu necesită abținerea de la început de la o atare intruziune doar din cauza riscului de a încălca spațiul de bază al confidențialității în timpul procesului de colectare.
În afară de acest aspect, informațiile din zona de bază a vieții private obținute prin interceptarea telecomunicațiilor nu pot fi utilizate. Orice înregistrare ale acestora trebuie ștersă fără întârziere. Cu toate acestea, circumstanțele obținerii și ștergerii lor trebuie documentate. Este interzisă transmiterea sau utilizarea în alt mod a conținutului conectat la zona centrală, chiar și ca indicii de investigație.]

Core area of privacy
Furthermore, the interception of telecommunication must respect an inviolable area of privacy, the protection of which follows from the constitutional primacy of human dignity. Each individual must have the opportunity to express him – or herself – without fear of being monitored by government institutions: this includes things such as sentiments and feelings, reflections, opinions, and experiences of a strictly personal nature. This core area of privacy is deemed absolutely inviolable. Even substantial public interests cannot justify an infringement. However, only such investigative measures are precluded that render likely the capture of unconditionally protected information. The obtainment of such communication content in other ways merely leads to the prohibition of its utilisation. Thus, communication is protected when it takes place between persons sharing a special relationship of trust within the scope of this core area. This may concern family members or other very close friends. However, this protection is afforded only as long as there are no concrete indications that the conversation’s expected content will exhibit an immediate connection to a criminal offence.

(…)

However, cases where measures can be expected to yield exclusively information from the core area will hardly ever occur in practice. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court considers it practically unavoidable in many cases that the investigative authorities will take notice of information during the telecommunication interception, before they are able to recognise its connection to the core area; in these cases, the Constitution does not require refraining from the intrusion from the outset merely due to the risk of infringing the core area of privacy during the collection process.
Apart from that, information from the core area of privacy obtained through the interception of telecommunication may not be utilised. Any recordings thereof are to be deleted without delay. The circumstance of their obtainment and deletion, however, are to be documented. The passing on or other use of content connected with the core area, even as investigative clues, is prohibited.

Benjamin Vogel, Patrick Koppen, Thomas Wahl
(Germany Report în Access to Telecomunication Data in Criminal Justice (coord. U. Sieber, N. von zur Muhlen), Duncker & Humblot, decembrie 2016, la pp, 514 și 529)

În Olanda, avocații sunt obligați să-și introducă numărul de telefon într-un sistem care îi protejează automat împotriva înregistrării conversațiilor

8 noiembrie 2018

A very interesting and distinct approach to interruption of interception and deletion of all records related to privileged communications can be found in the Netherlands. The Dutch model of dealing with the protection of professional secrecy in practice represents a hybrid model of deletion of records and filtering and deserves additional attention. As a general rule in The Netherlands, if the conversation of persons enjoying special privilege is recorded, it has to be deleted. However, this rule has different technical implications, depending on profession. A specific technical solution is implemented for the communications of lawyers. The special system, which holds all telephone and fax numbers used by lawyers in a filter registered with the National Interception Unit, was implemented in 2011. When the interception of communication starts, the traffic data are routed to this filter and, if the system recognises the number as belonging to a lawyer, the data capture ends automatically. If any delay in transfer happens, any information already recorded is deleted. All lawyers in The Netherlands are obliged to register their telephone numbers in this system. However, this filtering rule is applicable, first of all, only to lawyers and, secondly, only to the content of voice (telephone) communications. Conversations of other professions pledged to confidentiality are not the subject of this automatic filtering. Automatic filtering is not performed for IP communications (IP traffic). There are ongoing discussions in The Netherlands on how to ensure the destruction of IP traffic because, although data can be deleted or overwritten, it is still technically possible to find them.

Tatiana Tropina
(Comparative Analysis în Access to Telecomunication Data in Criminal Justice (coord. U. Sieber, N. von zur Muhlen), Duncker & Humblot, decembrie 2016, la p. 49)

Autoritățile care fac interceptări au obligația prevăzută în lege de a publica statistici cu privire la aceste măsuri în Germania, Franța, Belgia și Suedia

7 noiembrie 2018

At the national level, however, the publication of statistical data serves to make law enforcement work transparent and allows for the indication of at least certain trends in the application of interception measures. The obligation to collect and report statistics on communications interception exists in Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden. National reporters from the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic indicated that, although there is no legally established duty for law enforcement to collect statistics, data is publicly available, eg., in the United Kingdom, the number of warrants is reported for both police and security services by the respective commissioners. In the Czech Republic, despite the absence of such an obligation in the law, the police are required under internal regulations to publish analytical and statistical information, including data on the interception of communications. Some of the country reports, like that from Belgium, also referred to statistics in the transparency and disclosure reports from electronic communications service providers, e.g., Google, Vodafone, Microsoft, etc., as to the assessment of the number of requests coming from law enforcement agencies. Spain is the only country where such a reporting obligation does not exist and statistical data are not currently available to the public.

Tatiana Tropina
(Comparative Analysis în Access to Telecomunication Data in Criminal Justice (coord. U. Sieber, N. von zur Muhlen), Duncker & Humblot, decembrie 2016, la p. 22)

În Spania, conținutul interceptărilor realizate de serviciile secrete este clasificat și nu poate fi, drept urmare, folosit în instanță

6 noiembrie 2018

Like France, Spanish procedural legislation provides only for the general obligation to report facts on a possible crime to the police, prosecutor, or investigating judge. In addition there is a general provision on cooperation in Article 4 of the law on the National Intelligence Centre (CNI), which refers to the coordination of action between different government bodies. In practice, as shared by the Spanish law enforcement agency representatives during the workshop, information obtained by the CNI can be used only for the purpose of state security and strictly for the aim of criminal investigation; it cannot be shared with anyone except the Guardia Civil. Intelligence services can share data for the purpose of criminal investigation only as names or addresses or other identifiers, but they are not allowed to hand over the content of intercepted communications. Since all the information obtained by the CNI is classified, the police authority has no possibility to use this data in court.

Tatiana Tropina
(Comparative Analysis în Access to Telecomunication Data in Criminal Justice (coord. U. Sieber, N. von zur Muhlen), Duncker & Humblot, decembrie 2016, la p. 20)

Afirmațiile generale realizate de instanțele naționale, aici inclusiv ÎCCJ, și dreptul de a fi asistat de un avocat

6 noiembrie 2018

45. In the present case, the Government argued that the applicant had been assisted by defence lawyers who had been able to raise his complaints before the domestic courts (see paragraph 35 above). Indeed in Ibrahim and Others (cited above, § 274, point (c)) an important factor considered by the Court in order to assess the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings was whether the applicant “had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use”. In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant in the current case complained before the domestic courts of the lack of access to a lawyer during his initial questioning by the police and requested that his initial statement be excluded from the evidence to be considered during the trial (see paragraph 14 above). He reiterated his complaint in the appeal and cassation proceedings (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above). The Tulcea County Court and the Constanţa Court of Appeal did not address the applicant’s specific allegation and merely mentioned, in a general manner, that he had had access to a lawyer when he had been formally informed of the charges against him and throughout the proceedings (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above). The High Court of Cassation and Justice, deciding on the applicant’s case with final effect, considered that all the statements taken during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings had been in compliance with the law since the applicant had not been detained and therefore legal representation had not been mandatory in his case (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). The Court considers that in making only general statements and invoking the non-mandatory aspect of the legal representation in the applicant’s situation the domestic courts did not repair the consequences resulting from the absence of a lawyer during the applicant’s initial questioning by the police (see, mutatis mutandis, Sîrghi, cited above, § 52; and contrast Ibrahim and Others, cited above, §§ 282-284).
(…)
58. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court is not satisfied that the applicant received a fair trial. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (e) of the Convention.
(…)
63. The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress for a violation of Article 6 § 1 would be to ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is put in the position in which he would have been had this provision not been disregarded (see Saldüz, cited above, § 72, and the cases cited therein). The Court finds that this principle also applies in the present case. Consequently, it considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be a retrial in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, should the applicant so request.

Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului
(Hotărârea din data de 30 octombrie 2018, K. C. împotriva României, cererea nr. 45060/10, CE:ECHR:2018:1030JUD004506010)

Dreptul Uniunii nu impune pedepsirea penală a persoanelor juridice în cazul spălării banilor, fraudei sau faptelor de corupție

6 noiembrie 2018

The measures on the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law are of fundamental importance for all harmonising activity in the field of substantive criminal law. The legal acts issued in this context often serve as models and are in part transferred to other areas.
The PIF Convention, which entered into force in 2002 and obligates Member States to punish fraudulent activity damaging to the Union, forms the basis of European criminal law on financial protection. Pursuant to Art. 1(1) PIF Convention, this includes – summed up roughly – intentional acts using or presenting false information that result in funds from the Union’s budget being wrongfully retained or illegally diminished. In addition, it covers the misapplication of funds that were originally lawfully granted. Furthermore, the PIF Convention includes several fragmentary regulations on the General Part. Thus Member States are obliged to penalise the participation in, instigation of, and attempt to commit EU fraud. However, these normative concepts are not defined, and thus it remains up to the Member States to specify them further. For example, national law determines when an act constitutes a punishable attempt and when it counts as a non-punishable preparatory act. Accordingly, the harmonisation effects of the PIF Convention are minor in that regard. Also, the guidelines regarding sanctions and jurisdiction are very general. The PIF Convention was supplemented by two protocols with respect to substantive law. Protocol I, which also entered into force in 2002, aims to protect the Union’s finances against attacks from within. It obligates Member States to punish acts of active or passive corruption by certain officials if the acts damage or could damage the financial interests of the Union. Protocol II, which became effective in 2009, on the one hand aims to create a common basis to combat money laundering damaging to the Union. On the other hand, it sets up minimum rules on the punishment of legal persons. When doing so, it remains up to the Member States whether they wish to hold these persons accountable under criminal or administrative law for the fraud, corruption or money laundering offences committed by their heads.

Kai Ambos
(Europeanised Substantive Criminal Law in the Broader Sense (Council of Europe and EU) în European Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, iunie 2018, la pp. 324-325)

Frauda cetățeanului american Bernard Lawrence Madoff a produs la nivel mondial un prejudiciu de aproximativ 65 de miliarde de dolari SUA

31 octombrie 2018

2. Această întrebare se ridică în speță în contextul unei decizii a autorității luxemburgheze de supraveghere financiară de a‑i retrage domnului DV recunoașterea unei bune reputații, care reprezintă o condiție necesară pentru ocuparea funcțiilor de conducere în cadrul întreprinderilor de investiții. Decizia s‑a întemeiat pe rolul acestuia în cadrul constituirii și al administrării unei întreprinderi implicate în scandalul financiar Madoff(4).
Nota de subsol 4:
4. Frauda cetățeanului american Bernard Lawrence Madoff a produs la nivel mondial un prejudiciu de aproximativ 65 de miliarde de dolari SUA. În anul 2009, domnul Madoff a fost condamnat la o pedeapsă privativă de libertate de 150 de ani.

Juliane Kokott
(Concluziile prezentate în data de 26 iulie 2017, C-358/16, EU:C:2017:606)

În Franța, dreptul de a fi prezumat nevinovat este invocabil în raporturile de drept privat (art. 9-1 din Codul civil)

30 octombrie 2018

En France le droit à la présomption d’innocence est invocable dans les rapports de droit privé. Elle est a ce titre consacrée en tant que droit de la personnalité à l’article 9-1 du Code civil.
La question de l’effet horizontal des droits subjectifs publics est très controversée en Allemagne.

Hervé Henrion
(La presomption d’innocence, ébauche d’une comparaison franco-allemande în VERS UN NOUVEAU PROCÈS PÉNAL? NEUE WEGE DES STRAFPROZESSES (coord. Jocelyne LEBLOIS-HAPPE), 2008, la p. 126)

Textul trimiterii nu a fost dat publicităţii de Curtea Constituţională a României … totuși, conținutul esențial al cererii a fost dezvăluit în limba neerlandeză …

30 octombrie 2018

Nota de subsol
121 Textul trimiterii nu a fost dat publicităţii de Curtea Constituţională a României, invocându-se dispoziţiile art. 12 din Legea nr. 47/1992 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Curţii Constituţionale, republicată, respectiv faptul că actele şi lucrările Curţii Constituţionale, pe baza cărora aceasta pronunţă deciziile şi hotărârile ori emite avizele, nu sunt destinate publicităţii. Este o situaţie unică la nivelul tuturor tribunalelor constituţionale din statele membre ale Uniunii Europene, care obişnuiesc să publice imediat după motivare astfel de trimiteri preliminare, chiar în domenii tehnice şi mai puţin spectaculoase pentru public decât cel vizat de trimiterea din această cauză. Totuşi, conţinutul esenţial al cererii a fost dezvăluit, înainte de publicarea în JO, în limba neerlandeză, la http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/ecer/ecer/import/hof_van_justitie/nieuwe_hofzaken_inclusief_verwijzingsuitspraak/2017/c-zakennummers/c-673-16-verwijzingsbeschikking_redacted.pdf, spre satisfacţia cercetătorilor, inclusiv a autorului prezentei lucrări.

Dragoș Călin
(Tribunalele constituţionale şi procedura trimiterii preliminare la Curtea de Justiţie a Uniunii Europene în Revista Română de Drept European, nr. 2/2018, articol consultat on-line la www.idrept.ro motiv pentru care nu dețin pagina exactă)

Câte hotărâri fac o jurisprudență constantă? (conform Curții Constituționale a Sloveniei)

29 octombrie 2018

According to the stare decisis doctrine in common law jurisdictions, in order to have a binding character the existence of a (single) precedent is enough. On the contrary, the mentioned positions of the Slovenian Constitutional Court follow the civil law doctrine of jurisprudence constante (ständige Rechtsprechung). The fundamental difference between the two legal doctrines is that a single case affords a sufficient foundation for the former, while a series of adjudicated cases all in accord forms the predicate for the latter. Hence, unde the jurisprudence constante doctrine authoritative force stems from a consolidated trend of decisions. (…)
The question that therefore arises is when case law can be considered settled. Pursuant to the Constitutional Court (in accordance with the jurisprudence constante doctrine), the case law is settled if it has been consistently applied over a sufficiently long period of time; there must be, in principle, a line of decisions without divergence concerning relevant legal positions applying to sufficiently similar facts. In this regard, the Constitutional Court realistically adminits that there is no mathematical formula as to how many decisions without divergence already constitute settled case law. This certainly depends also on the multiplicity or rarity of certain types of disputes or legal questions raised before the court. The type of legal issues is also relevant in this regard; the Constitutional Court stated that it needs to be especially cautious and restrained in establishing whether there already exists settled case law concerning cases in which the decision-making of the court is inseparably linked with respect to the specific circumstances of every single case (e.g. concerning the quantum of damages for specific types of injuries). But in principle, one or two decisions do not already demonstrate settled case law.

A. Galič
(The Inconsistency of Case Law and the Right to a Fair Trial in Revisiting Procedural Human Rights (coord. A. Uzelac, C. H. van Rhee), Intersentia, iunie 2017, la pp. 24-25)