Metaforele în drept trebuie atent supravegheate pentru că adesea sfârșesc prin a înrobi

3 decembrie 2017
521 citiri

(…)
O întrebare dificilă: este loc pentru figuri de stil în drept? Este oare judicios să afirmăm că, în ciuda definiției, metafora se poate regăsi în științele juridice, deși trăsăturile sale specifice pot părea de-a dreptul antinomice discursului juridic clasic?
Nu este, oare, un non-sens să îndrăznim să ne imaginăm că metafora poate exista – și că poate, în plus, juca un rol important – într-o disciplină încărcată de rigoare prin esența sa? Însăși definiția ei, la suprafață, ne trimite înspre un răspuns care ar putea pune capăt de la bun început oricărei cercetări pe această temă: „funcție artistică” „nuanțe” „sensibilizare” „sens abstract” „poezie”. Metafora reprezintă un transfer, o digresiune prin alte domenii sau prin alte concepte – altele decât cele despre care se face vorbire; metafora presupune o cale derivată, un ocoliș, un „vagabondaj al spiritului”, un „travaliu al asemănării”. Concluzia aparentă: locul metaforei nu este în drept, ci în domeniul poeziei, al imaginației, al creației artistice. Și, totuși, ezităm să punem punct aici. Dreptul nu reprezintă întotdeauna rigoare, după cum nici metafora nu este întotdeauna un trop ‘inventat’, ci se întâmplă să exprime și adevărul, și asta uneori mai bine chiar decât ar face-o exprimarea riguroasă.
(…)
Primul exemplu ne vine dinspre Montesquieu care, în Despre spiritul legilor (1748), întreprinde o analiză sistematică și comparatică a structurii politico-juridice a statelor, atât din epoca sa cât și din trecut. (…) Unul dintre cele mai relevante elemente de noutate în lucrarea sa constă în separarea problemei formelor de guvernământ de cea a libertății. Pentru ca să nu existe posibilitatea de a se abuza de putere, trebuie, ca prin rânduiala statornicită, puterea să fie înfrânată de putere. Puterea legislativă și cea executivă trebuie încredințate mai degrabă unor dregători permanenți, spre deosebire de cea judecătorească, imaginată ca oarecum inexistentă (în original: en quelque facon, nul). Judecătorii „nu sunt decât gura care rostește cuvintele legii, niște ființe neînsuflețite, care nu-i pot modera nici forța, nici severitatea”. (…) Judecătorul este perceput a fi pentru lege ceea ce gura este pentru om, organul care pronunță cuvintele gândite de acesta, lipsit de autonomie de gândire, rezumându-se la enunțarea ideilor omului, aflându-se în strânsă relație de subordonare față de creierul care le concepe. (…) Metafora, centrată pe poziția judecătorului în raport cu legiuitorul, continuă să alimenteze dezbateri în privința aplicării legii, ridicându-se problema marjei de manevră de care dispune judecătorul în exercitarea funcțiilor sale.
(…) Desigur că există și opinii contrare în legătură cu rolul jucat de metaforă în drept. „Metaforele în drept trebuie atent supravegheate pentru că, deși gândite ca mijloace de a elibera gândirea, adesea sfârșesc prin a o înrobi” (cu trimitere la Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway, 244 N. Y. 84,94, 155 N.E. 58, 1926 – opinia a fost redactată de judecătorul Benjamin N. Cardozo). (s.n. -M.M.-B.)

Andreea Verteș-Olteanu
(Aceasta nu este o metaforă (este loc pentru figuri de stil în drept?), în Despre Juriști (coord. R. Bercea, A. Mercescu), Universul Juridic, București, 2017, la pp. 197-211)

Eroarea logică Nirvana și combaterea propunerilor (inclusiv legislative)

2 decembrie 2017

[Eroarea Nirvana

(…)
Se critică o soluție la o problemă pe motiv că nu rezolvă complet problema; cu alte cuvinte, pe motiv că nu este o soluție ideală a problemei.

Exemplu

Spui că interzicerea conducerii în stare de ebrietate va salva vieți. Dar oamenii vor muri în continuare în accidente, indiferent dacă conduc sau nu sub influența alcoolului!

Exemplu din viața reală

Avocații (sau Adepții – propunere cititor) „doar ai abstinenței” ca educație sexuală se opun ca adolescenții să fie educați cu privire la prezervative și alte metode de control pe motiv că acestea pot da greș. Contraceptivele nu funcționează întotdeauna, susțin ei, și ca atare nu pot reprezenta o soluție la problema adolescentelor rămase însărcinate.
Ei ignoră faptul că prezervativele și alte contraceptive au totuși o rată foarte mare de succes și, prin urmare, sunt un instrument eficient în combaterea sarcinii adolescentine și a BTS-urilor.

Greșeala

Puteți face lucrurile mai bine fără a le face perfecte. (Într-adevăr, dacă țintiți perfecțiunea, de cele mai multe ori nu veți reuși deloc să faceți ceva bun, așa cum toți perfecționiștii o știu!). Adversarul tău te critică pentru că nu ai făcut perfectă o situație; cu toate acestea, obiectivul dvs. nu este de a face lucrurile perfecte, ci numai de a îmbunătăți lucrurile cât mai mult posibil.

Replica (pe care o puteți oferi pentru a combate această eroare – n.n.)

Trebuie doar să subliniați că scopul dumneavoastra nu a fost niciodată de a face lucrurile perfecte, ci doar de a îmbunătăți puțin situația (cu excepția situației în care de fapt ați promis perfecțiunea, caz în care ați căutat-o cu lumânarea!). Propunerea dvs. nu poate fi comparată cu cea de-a Doua Venire, dar poate îmbunătăți lucrurile puțin – și nu este asta mai bine decât nimic? De asemenea, puteți să întrebați adversarul dacă are o soluție alternativă la problema pusă pe masă; dacă nu, soluția dvs. poate fi limitată, dar este în continuare cea mai bună soluție pusă în discuție.

Semnificația erorii

Există anumite circumstanțe în care acest argument-eroare poate fi legitim: în cazul în care propunerea dumneavoastră nu reușește să treacă peste raportul cost / beneficiu, de exemplu, atunci când nu este eficientă din perspectiva concurențială. Deci, dacă propunerea nu are decât o eficacitate limitată, ea ar putea să nu justifice costurile implementării acesteia. Alternativ, dacă propunerea oponentului nu numai că rezolvă aceleași probleme pe care și soluția ta le rezolvă, ci și alte probleme pe care soluția ta le lasă nerezolvate, atunci soluția oponentului ar trebui să fie preferată.

Această înșelăciune/eroare este, în anumite privințe, partea opusă a erorii Apelului la Disperare (vezi pagina 50). În cazul Apelului la Disperare, este recomandată o anumită soluție doar pentru că ar satisface niște minime cerințe, fără a se lua în considerare raportul cost-beneficiu, fezabilitatea altor soluții și așa mai departe. Deși în acel caz standardul pentru acceptatea unei soluții este unul prea scăzut, aici standardul este prea înalt: dacă soluția propusă nu poate să aducă Paradisul pe pământ, atunci ea trebuie respinsă.

Inutil să spun că ambele poziții sunt lipsite de moderație. – traducere și subliniere M.M.-B.]

Nirvana Fallacy

(…)
Criticizing a proponen’s solution to a problem on the grounds that it does not solve the problem completly; in other words, on the grounds that if falls short of an ideal solution to the problem.

Example

‘You say that banning drunk driving will save lives on the road. But people will still die in car crashes, whether driving under the influence or not!’

Real-life example

Advocates of ‘abstinence only’ sex education are opposed to teaching teenagers about contraception on the grounds that condoms and other birth-control methods can, and do, fail. Since contraceptives don’t always work, they contend, they cannot provide the solution to teen pregnancy. They ignore the fact that condoms and other contraceptives still have a very high success rate, and are therefore an effective tool in fighting teen pregnancy and STDs.

The Mistake

You can make things better without making them perfect. (Indeed, if you aim at perfection, you will frequently fail to do anything good at all, as all perfectionists know!). Your opponent criticizes you for not making a situation perfect; however, your aim was not to make things perfect, but only to improve things as much as possible.

The Comeback

You need only point out that your aim was never to make things perfect, only to improve things a bit (unless you did promise perfection, in which case you asked for it!). Your proposal wont’t bring about the Second Coming, but it may still ameliorate things a little bit – and isn’t that better than nothing? You could also ask your opponent if he has an alternative solution to the problem; if he doesn’t, then your solution may have limited effectiveness, but is still the best solution on the market.

Significance

There are certain circumstances under which this sort of argument can be legitimate: where the proposal fails a cost/benefit ration, for instance, or where it isn’t as effective as a competing proposal. So, if the proposal only has limited effectiveness, it may not justify the cost of its implementation. Alternatively, if the opponent’s proposal not only solves the problems that yours does, but also solves some problems that yours doesn’t, then his solution should be preferred.
This fallacy, is, in some ways, the flipside of the Appeal to Desperation (see p. 50). In that instance, a course of action was recommended because it minimally satisfied a certain demand, without considering the cost-benefit ratio, the feasibility of other plans, etc. Whereas that fallacy placed the bar for accepting a course of action too low, here the bar is set too high: unless the proposal can bring about heave on earth, it should be rejected.
Needless to say, both positions are immoderate.

Michael Withey
(Mastering Logical Fallacies, Zephyros Press, Berkeley, California, 2016, la pp. 154-155)

Când se poate observa cea mai evidentă diferență dintre un avocat cu experiență și unul fără?

2 decembrie 2017

Unfavourable answer to witness.
The last point made by Cox in this section is also a very important one. He suggests though he does not say it clearly that the advocate must play the role of an actor when he is faced with an answer by the witness which is not favourable to his client. In his own words:
‘The most cautious cross-examination will not always prevent the most disagreeable of incidents to an Advocate, the receipt of an answer that tells strongly against him, when his is anticipating an answer in his favour. When such a contretemps occurs, it is most important that you SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE. Let neither countenance, nor tone of voice, nor expression of annoyance, show to the spectator that you are conscious of being taken aback. If they laugh, be not vexed; if others exhibit surprise, be as calm and appear as satisfied as if you HAVE EXPECTED IT. Thus you will repel the force of the blow, for seeing that you are not perplexed by it, the audience begin to suppose it not to be so important as they deem it to be, or they give you credit for some profounder purpose than apparent, or that you are prepared with a contradiction, or explanation. Sometimes, indeed, where the blow has been more than usually staggering, it may not be bad policy to weaken its force by openly making light of it, repeating it, taking note of it, or appending a joke to it. At to no time is self-command more requisite to an Advocate than such a moment, and never is the contrast between experience and inexperience, the prudent and the injudicious, more palpably exhibited‘ (cu trimitere la Edward William Cox, The Advocate, His Training, Practice, Rights and Duties, vol. I, 1852, pp. 388-389)

G. A. Serghides
(On the Art of Cross-examination. Four great old authorities, two englishmen and two americans, with emphasis on their principles, Nicosia, 2009, la pp. 112-113)

Proiectul Uniunii Europene a fost lansat în 1929 la Geneva

1 decembrie 2017

Quant au projet de l’Union européenne, il fut lancé par Briand des septembre 1929 à Genève, dans le sein de la S.D.N. Avec une prescience géniale, Briand voulait faire accompagner la liquidation des conséquences temporaires de la guerre, par une entente européenne contre la crise économique alors menaçante, mais non encore declanchée. Sans aucun doute, c’est lui qui voyait juste. Les peuples payeront longtemps les consequences de la timidité et de l’égoïsme qui firent, à ce moment, obstacle au succes d’une oeuvre nécessaire.
Aristide Briand n’a pas seulement fait preuve de souplesse et de puissance d’invention. Il a été aussi courageux et tenace. Il n’a pas hésité à denoncer publiquement les forces qui se dressent pour empecher les peuples de s’unir. Et c’est cela qu’on ne lui a pas pardonné et qui fut la vraie cause des violentes campagnes déchainées contre son oeuvre, en France comme ailleurs.
(…)
Il ne fut pas seulement un grand homme, mais aussi un homme simple et bon.
Pendant toute sa vie, il garda les mêmes collaborateurs, compagnons fidèles des bonnes et des mauvaises heures. Il sut s’entourer de techniciens remarquables que, contrairement à la legende, il consultait et écoutait à tout moment. Faut-il dire aussi qu’il a toujours témoigné aux anciens combattants une amitie profonde et efficace.
J’ai servi à ses cotes pendant des mois, en homme libre. Il est parti sans que j’aie reçu de lui la plus petite faveur matérielle, même pas sa signature ou sa photographie. Mais je puis témoigner de sa sincérité, de sa passion de bien faire, de la constante noblesse de des buts et de ses actions et de sa bienveillante simplicité, apanage des hommes vraiment supérieures. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

René Cassin
(Aristide Briand în La Pensée et l’Action, Editions F. Lalou, 1972, pp. 33-34)

Cum aflăm când minte martorul? (limbajul trupului și primele două principii ale lui Brown)

30 noiembrie 2017

Brown’s first two out of his nine rules of cross-examination deal with body language.
The first rule is that, save in indifferent matters, cross-examining counsel must never take his eye from that of the witness. He rightly observes that ‘this is the channel of communication, from mind to mind, the loss of which nothing can compensate‘. And he goes to say this in inverted commas:
Truth, falsehood, hatred, anger, scorn, despair,
And all the passions – all the soul is there„.
Brown’s second rule of cross-examination is that the cross-examiner must not be regardless of the voice of the witness since ‘next to the eye, this is perhaps the best interpreter of his mind‘.
Brown gives an excellent instance where the cross-examiner must be watchful of the voice of a witness who tries to evade.
Suppose that it is important to know that the witness was at the corner of Sixth and Chestnut streets at a certain time. HE is asked at his cross-examination: ‘Were you at the corner of Sixth and Chestnuts streets at six o’clock? If the witness was sincere his answer would perhaps be ‘I was near there’. But if he is not frank and he is desirous to conceal a fact and defeat the object of the inquiry, his answer would perhaps be that ‘ I was not at the corner at six o’clock’, although he may have been very close to that place. As Brown well remarks ‘emphasis upon both words plainly implies a mental evasion or equivocation, and gives rise, with a skillful examiner to the question, At what hour were you at the corner? or at what place were you at six o’clock? and in nine instances out of ten, it will appear that the witness was at the place about the time, or at the time about the place’. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

George A. Serghides
(On the Art of Cross-examination. Four great old authorities, two englishmen and two americans, with emphasis on their principles, Nicosia, 2009, la pp. 36-37)

Apelul la autoritate ca eroare logică (și experții corupți)

29 noiembrie 2017

Appeal to authority
Argumentum ad Verecundiam
(…)
Attempting to support an argument P, not by offering any direct evidence that P, but by appealing to testimony of an authority A.

Example

My dad says that scientists just planted dinosaur bones to discredit creationism. Hence, evolution must be false!

Real-life example

Some figures of the early Christian church did not believe that the earth was round, because this contradicted the authority of the Bible.Thus, the Bishop of Gabala (4th Century AD) argued that the earth was flat, because this is what Scripture says: if it was round, how could the Lord ‘stretch out the heavens as a curtain, and spread them out as a tent to dwell in’ ( Isiah 40:22)? Fortunately, the view of these ‘flart Earthers’ never became official doctrine.

The Mistake

There is no problem with justifying a belief by appeal to authority, provided that the authority is an expert on the subject at hand.
So if John is an expert on nuclear physics, it’s reasonable to believe the claims he makes about, say, the possibility of cold fusion; however, it would be silly to defer to his authority qua nuclear physicist were he to pronounce on the death penalty.

The Comeback

Demand proof of the authority’s credentials on the subject under discussion. Does this person have expertise relevant to the topic at hand? If not, why on earth should you listen to them?
Even if this authority does have the relevant expertise, you can still raise doubts. An expert’s opinion may not represent the consensus of other experts in the field; indeed, he may be in the minority, and other experts may treat him as crank. Similarly, the expert may have a vested interest in getting people to accept his opinions: he may be misusing his expertise to gain a financial or other personal benefit. So, you could always demand a second opinion or corroboration from other experts in the field.
(…) (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Michael Withey
(Mastering logical fallacies, Zephyros Press, Berkeley, California, 2016, la pp. 43-44)

Cele trei principii de interpretare dezvoltate în anii ’70 de CEDO

28 noiembrie 2017

The ECHR cannot be conceived independently from public international law and international human rights law, as it is an integral part of both systems. Being an international treaty, the ECHR clearly falls under the rules that govern the interpretation, scope, and validity of such instruments. In this context, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) has played a considerable role in shaping the interpretation techniques used by the Strasbourg bodies.
(…)
The Golder v United Kingdom case, a landmark judgment handed down by the ECtHR in 1975, set the tone of the interpretation framework that the Court would develop in subsequent years. The case contains the first, and the most exhaustive, discussion of the rules of interpretation contained in the VCLT. At that time, none of the interpretation principles used by the ECtHR existed; the ‘living instrument’ principle was established in the tyrer case in 1978, the theory of autonomous concepts was inaugurated in the Engel case in 1976, and the principle of effectiveness was thoroughly applied in the Airey case in 1978.
It therefore appears that the Court used the VCLT as the backbone on which it implanted its interpretation framework.
(…)
Nonetheless, the Court’s reliance on Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT gives rise to difficult questions. The interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention do not provide standardized solutions to uncertain treaty interpretations and for decades scholars have grappled with the issues that they raise. The courts that resort to them are therefore faced with many options when interpreting a treaty.
(…)
The pivotal centre around which the interpretation of the ECHR revolves therefore resides in the Strasbourg Court’s self-perception in a given case. Indeed, the role that the Court has played in the different cases has had a variable geometry, one that was highly conditioned by the margin of appreciation granted to Contracting States and by the predisposition of the judges that composed the Court.
Thus, it becomes difficult to deduce a single approach of the Court towards the VCLT; also to require one on the part of the Court would perhaps be unrealistic.

Magdalena Forowicz
(The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2010, la pp. 23-24)

Este prostituția în mod intrinsec o activitate contrară demnității umane? (Ulpianus, Kant, contractul de căsătorie, și legiferarea)

27 noiembrie 2017

One of the major philosophical justification for laws making sexual services (or the use of these) illegal is that prostitution is, intrinsically, a violation of human dignity, especially of the human dignity of women. Paying a person in order to accomplish a sexual act upon her or to have her accomplish a sexual act upon oneself is, so the argument runs, using her as a mere tool for sexual gratification, and this is so even if we suppose – what some claim to be impossible – that the person in question offers her sexual services voluntarily and without being forced or coerced. Consent may be transformative in many instances, but it cannot transform a prostitutional act into something compatible with human dignity, however well the client may treat the prostitute. Behind the humane treatment in the context of particular acts, one should always see the inhumane institution. In this sense, prostitution could be said to resemble slavery.
(…)
In order to answer this question (i.e. whether prostitution intrinsically violates human dignity), we need a definition of prostitution and a definition of human dignity.
(…) I (…) want to give what I think to be a morally neutral definition of prostitution, or more precisely a definition of a prostitutional act: a prostitutional act – in the sexual sense of the word – is an act by which an individual exchanges a sexual service against something which is not sexual.
(…) According to my definition, a mistress who receives what she needs to live from her lover is a prostitute – at least if we suppose that she doesn’t also expect sexual gratification from him. To be a prostitute, one need only fulfill one and a half of the elements mentioned by the Roman jurist Ulpianus: for money, without pleasure, with anybody. Having sex with anybody, i.e. not to be selective as to one’s sexual partners, is called promiscuity, and though it is true that prostitutes are promiscuous, promiscuity does not, at least not in my thesis, belong to the essence of prostitution. The defining elements of prostitution are the absence of pleasure – in the sense that the prostitute does not seek sexual gratification – and receiving something non-sexual in exchange.
(…)
Promiscuity does not necessarily mean that one will perform sexual acts just with or for anybody. It just means that one does not limit one’s sexual acts to one single person. A person may well be promiscuous and categorically refuse to perform sexual acts with or for a person whom she knows will treat her like a mere thing. So, even if we included promiscuity in our definition of prostitution, it would not commit us to the view that prostitution is intrinsically a violation of human dignity. It might, however, commit us to the view that prostitution is a violation of the dignity of sexuality – at least if we conceive of sexuality as an activity which is intrinsically monogamous.
(…)
What some persons provide out of love, what is taken by force from some other persons, prostitutes provide for money.
Of course, in a loving relationship lovers get much more than just sexual gratification. For them, sexuality is also a means of communicating their mutual love to each other, it is one of the many ways they have to feel close to each other, etc. All these related aspects are absent from a prostitutional relationship and they are also generally expected to be absent. In this sense, one can say that prostitutional sex is an impoverished form of sexuality.
(…)
As was said before, the question whether prostitution intrinsically violated human dignity presupposes a definition of prostitution and a definition of human dignity.
(…) Hence the question is: what do we expect from a human being as a human being? It should be clear from the outset that these expectations will not just be biological expectations, but that they will refer to elements which distinguish human beings and which give them their value. If we place ourselves in the Kantian tradition ( and this tradition is predominant today, at least in continental Europe), what gives us our value is our autonomy: i.e. our ability to give ourselves our own law of action. Hence Kant’s categorical imperative which urges us not to treat humanity, either in ourselves or in others, merely as a means, but always as an end in itself. This means that we should never forget that human beings can and should determine by themselves the laws which will guide their actions. And, for Kant, this capacity is linked to reason. Respecting human dignity is respecting the capacity to decide for oneself, following one’s reason, how one is going to act.
For Kant, submitting oneself to the sexual desire of another is giving him to understand that one accepts being his tool for sexual gratification, so that the other stops seeing in that person an end in itself and so being capable to decide for itself. It is as if a human being became an inflatable doll. In order to escape this fate, according to Kant, the person who submits herself to sexual intercourse must first contract with the other person, the core of the contract being that the two persons bind themselves for life, so that whatever consequences will follow from their sexual intercourse – pregnancy, diseases, etc. – they will have to bear them together, in the sense that neither can discard the other as he would discard a lemon out of which he has taken all the juice.
(…)
One of the major moral-legal problems confronting legislators today is the following: once we admit that many prostitutes are exploited and treated as mere objects, should one, like Scandinavian countries, make laws aimed at criminalizing the buying of sexual services – though not the selling, as prostitutes are seen as victims – or should one make laws giving more rights to prostitutes, thus officially recognizing prostitution? At a more fundamental level, two opposite views confront each other: on the one hand, the view that prostitution must disappear as it is fundamentally incompatible with human dignity. And, on the other hand, the view that only forced prostitution must disappear. And, among those who merely hold that forced prostitution must disappear we find those who think that the only means to get rid of forced prostitution is to criminalize the buying of sexual services as such and those who think that one can get rid of forced prostitution without a wholesale criminalization of the buying of sexual services. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Norbert Campagna
(Human dignity and prostitution în The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, Cambridge University Press, 2014, la pp.454-460)

Când Curtea Europeană a Drepturilor Omului contrazice Curtea Constituțională Federală a Germaniei (dreptul la viață privată versus libertatea presei)

27 noiembrie 2017

The first series of photographs captured the Princess in a variety of situations. She was shown with Vincent London, the French actor and her boyfriend at the time, in a secluded restaurant courtyard. And she was shown alone, horseback riding and shopping. Both the German court of first instance and the German court of appeals took the conventional view of privacy and held against the Princess. They found that as an ‘absolute figure of contemporary history’ the Princess could not protest the publication of her photographs. Because of their importance to contemporary debate, such figures could only claim a right to privacy when in the home, not when in public spaces. The highest court – the Federal Court of Justice – was more sympathetic to the Princess. It found that a concept of privacy limited to the home, even in the case of public figures like the Princess, was too narrow. Such figures should be able to prevent the public from prying even outside the home, in other spaces of ‘seclusion’. In the Courts’s view, the restaurant courtyard in which the Princess was photographed eating with Vincent Lindon was precisely such a space of seclusion. The Court, therefore, enjoined the publication of the restaurant photographs but permitted publication of the remaining photographs since they involved entirely public places.
That, however, was not the end of the matter. The Princess of Monaco filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. In one respect, the Constitutional Court expanded her right to privacy. It found that children’s privacy should receive special constitutional protection. Children, the Constitutional Court reasoned, were especially vulnerable to the autonomy harms caused by privacy violations because their personalities were still developing. Unless a public figure like the Princess of Monaco intentionally took centre stage at a public event with her children, the interest of the press and the public in knowing about the children must give way to the children’s privacy. The Constitutional Court therefore enjoined the publication of all those photographs in which the Princess’s children appeared. Remaining in the public eye were only those photographs in which she appeared horseback riding and shopping.
(…)
The Princess had better luck before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court found that the publication of all the photographs at issue in the three German proceedings violated the Princess’s right to private life.
(…)
The Court then turned to the competing right of freedom of expression. (…)
The balance between the two rights, however, was struck in favour of the Princess and the right to privacy. The Court reached this conclusion based on the low value it attached to the speech involved in the case. The Court employed an implicit hierarchy of speech. At the bottom of this hierarchy, the Court placed the photographs of the Princess and declared them unworthy of protection, at least when in conflict with the right to privacy. The Court drew three distinctions.
First, according to the Court, words were superior to images because words generally communicated ideas whereas images could convey very personal information. Secondly, expression concerning politicians was considered more valuable than expression concerning private individuals. In the view of the Court, the Princess was a private individual because she did not exercise official functions on behalf of the State of Monaco. The third distinction employed by the Court was between information on an individual’s public life and information on that same individual’s private life. Only in special circumstances did the public have the right to learn of the latter. Thus, the Court held that Germany, in permitting publication of the photographs, had violated the right to privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights. In reaching this decision, the Court made only passing reference to Germany’s margin of appreciation on the rights question.
The purpose of this chapter is not to assess the correctness of the Court’s balance between privacy and expression in the Princess of Monaco case. This consideration of the Court’s reasoning is simply designed to show that there is ample room for disagreement on the matter. It would not be unreasonable to attach greater value to the photographs than was done in the case and, consequently, to find that the right to know about the Princess’s activities trumped the Princess’s right to privacy. This, in essence, is the conclusion that was reached by the German courts. And yet the European Court of Human Rights failed to take heed of Germany’s constitutional settlement. (s. n. – M.M.-B.)

Francesca Bignami
(Constitutional Patriotism and the Right to Privacy: A Comparison of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, în New Tehnologies and Human Rights (coord. T. Murphy), Oxford University Press, 2009, la pp. 152-154)

Eroarea logică la care apelează majoritatea politicilor reacționare și revoluționare

27 noiembrie 2017

[Eroare naturalistă

Strict vorbind, această eroare are legătură cu egalarea unei proprietăți non-naturale, cum ar fi bunătatea, cu o proprietate naturală, cum ar fi plăcerea. Colocvial spus, printr-o astfel de eroare se concluzionează faptul că ar fi trebuit să se întâmple ceva din cauza faptului că astfel e situația. Și mai colocvial explicat: se folosesc standardele derivate din natură pentru a se determina cum ar trebui să stea lucrurile și în cadrul societăților umane.

Exemplu:

Femeile sunt în mod natural potrivite pentru a avea grijă de casă.
Prin urmare, toate femeile ar trebui să stea acasă!

Exemplu de viață reală

Multe opinii politice, atât reacționare, cât și revoluționare, depind de această eroare. Ați putea fi familiarizat cu aceasta, de exemplu, din declarația unui homofob că homosexualitatea este greșită deoarece este ceva nefiresc; sau dincredința fascistă că în societate, ca și în natură, cei puternici ar trebui să conducă și să zdrobească pe cei slabi. Dar se regăsește și în retorica revoluționară, ca în cazul adagiului lui Rousseau: „omul se naște liber, dar este peste tot în lanțuri”.

Greșeala

Acest argument conferă „Naturii” o semnificație normativă nejustificată. Această semnificație este nejustificată deoarece, în primul rând, Natura nu este întotdeauna benignă (să fiți înțepați de o viespe și să-mi spuneți altfel); în al doilea rând, este neclar că putem deosebi cu adevărat ceea ce este „natural” de ceea ce este „nefiresc/nenatural” în acest fel, mai ales când vine vorba de un om. La urma urmei, omul este în mod firesc capabil să vorbească, să inventeze lucruri, să fie social. Deci, cum ar putea oricare dintre activitățile sale să fie nenaturale?

Replica (ce poate fi oferită la o atare eroare)

Sunt posibile mai multe răspunsuri (…)
În primul rând, puteți susține că acel comportament pe care îl combate adversarul dvs. este, de fapt, în întregime natural. Deci, este greu de argumentat că homosexualitatea este nenaturală, dacă  și până și animalele se angajează de asemenea într-un astfel de comportament.
În al doilea rând, puteți sublinia că ceea ce este natural nu este ipso facto bun. Deci, chiar dacă femeile sunt, prin natura lor, mai bine pregătite pentru a fi acasă (indiferent de ce înseamnă asta), nu înseamnă că ar trebui să fie reținute la domiciliu sau să renunțe la o carieră. La urma urmei, noi, oamenii, ne pricepem destul de bine la depășirea limitărilor noastre „naturale”.
Este demn de remarcat răspunsul lui Joseph de Maistre oferit lui Rousseau: „Ar fi la fel de corect să spunem că oile se nasc carnivore și peste tot mănâncă iarbă”. (s.n. -M.M.-B.)
(…)]

Naturalistic fallacy

Strictly speaking, this fallacy has to do with identifying a non-natural property, such as goodness, with a natural property, such as pleasure. More colloquially, deriving the fact that something ought to be the case from the fact that it is the case. More colloquially still: using standards derived from nature to determine what ought to be the case in human societies.

Example:

Women are naturally suited to be homemakers.
Therefore, all women ought to be homemakers!

Real-life example

Many political opinions, both reactionary and revolutionary, depend on this fallacy. You may be familiar with it in, for instance, a homophobe’s declaration that homosexuality is wrong, because it is unnatural; or the Fascist belief that in society, as in nature, the strong should rule and crush the weak. But it’s also found in revolutionary rethoric, as with Rousseau’s adage: ‘man is born free, but is everywhere in chains’.

The Mistake

This argument endows ‘Nature’ with an unwarranted normative significance. This significance is unwarranted because, first, nature isn’t always bening (get stung by a wasp and tell me otherwise); secondly, it’s unclear that we can really distinguish what’s ‘natural’ from what’s ‘unnatural’ in this way, especially when it comes to man. After all, man is naturally able to talk, to invent things, to be social.So, how can any of his activities be unnatural?

The Comeback

Several responses are possible (…)
First, you might argue that the behavior your opponent advocates is, in fact, entirely natural. So, it’s hard to argue that homosexuality is unnatural, if animals also engage in it.
Secondly, you could point out that what’s natural isn’t ipso facto good. So, even if women are, ‘by nature,’ better equipped to be homemakers (whatever that means), it doesn’t follow that they ought to be restricted to home, or denied careers. After all, we humans are pretty good at overcoming our ‘natural’ limitations.
It is worth noting Joseph de Maistre’s response to Rousseau: ‘It would be equally correct to say that sheep are born carnivorous and everywhere eat grass’.
(…)

Michael Withey
(Mastering logical fallacies, Zephyros Press, Berkeley, California, 2016, la pp. 150-152)