528 citiri

LA règle ne bis in idem a en effet trouvé dans la jurisprudence de la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation un usage plus récent et sans doute plus étonnant. Des décisions rendues depuis 2016 font en effect expressément référence à la règle, posée en visa, pour interdire que des faits unis par une intention unique puissent recevoir deux qualifications pénales distinctes (cu trimitere la Cass. crim. 26 oct. 2016, no. 15-84552; Cass. crim. 7 dec. 2016, no. 15-87335).
(…)

Valérie Malabat
(Ne bis in idem et le juge pénal, Revue du droit public, nr. 1/2018, la p. 34)

Article L465-3-6

I. – Le procureur de la République financier ne peut mettre en mouvement l’action publique pour l’application des peines prévues à la présente section lorsque l’Autorité des marchés financiers a procédé à la notification des griefs pour les mêmes faits et à l’égard de la même personne en application de l’article L. 621-15.

L’Autorité des marchés financiers ne peut procéder à la notification des griefs à une personne à l’encontre de laquelle l’action publique a été mise en mouvement pour les mêmes faits par le procureur de la République financier pour l’application des peines prévues à la présente section.
(…)

Code monétaire et financier

33 It must be added that, notwithstanding Article 23(5) of Regulation No 1/2003, which states that decisions imposing fines for infringements of the competition rules are not of a criminal law nature, the infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and of Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement involves engaging in conduct which is generally regarded as underhand, to the detriment of the public at large, and which entails a clear stigma and a potential fine, for the undertakings responsible, of up to 10% of annual turnover, which is undoubtedly severe (see the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in KME Germany and Others v Commission, C‑272/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:63, paragraph 64). Given the nature of the infringements in question and the nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties (see judgment of 27 March 2014 in Saint-Gobain Glass France and Others v Commission, T‑56/09 and T‑73/09, ECR, EU:T:2014:160, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited), those penalties pertain to criminal matters for the purpose of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), as can be seen, inter alia, from the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy (no. 43509/08, §§ 39 to 44, 27 September 2011).

Tribunalul Uniunii Europene
(Hotărârea din data de 16 decembrie 2015, T-9/11, Air Canada/Comisia, EU:T:2015:994)

The influence of European criminal law on national criminal law is not limited, however, to the obligation to prosecute arising from the directives provided for in Article 83 TFEU. Apart from the aspect of the substantial repeal of the incriminating provision due to its conflict with a directly applicable supranational rule, there is the question of finding exonerating regulations in a broad sense in the various sources of European law. We are talking about regulations that are incompatible with domestic incriminating regulations and may thus rule out or limit the applicability of the latter in relation to certain types of conduct, thanks to the hierarchical superiority generally attributed to European over domestic legislation. It is clear that the issue involves the conflict of laws, in this case only apparent because of the primacy of European law, which also excludes as a criterion for the solution of the conflict the ‘chronological’ profile: a European law takes precedence over an internal one even if passed prior to the latter. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the lawfulness of a given conduct, resulting from a regulation or a provision of the Treaty themselves, functions as a cause of justification with regard to typical conduct. (nota de subsol 35: What instead is problematic is the attribution of the same justification to provisions contained in directives, since these sources do not as a rule have direct effect on national law but require domestic legislative intervention. A well-established trend shows the existence within this category of European sources of ‘detailed’ or ‘analytical’ directives, which identify with a high degree of accuracy the elements that may cause a certain type of conduct, already considered typical under domestic criminal provisions, not to be seen as criminal in nature. Precisely this feature should make the provision of Community law immediately operational, with an ‘exonerating’ effect, even if the national legislature has failed to implement it, and precisely in order not to unjustly burden the accused with the negative consequences of such a failure.)

Giuseppe Toscano
(The principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege in the Construction of European Criminal Law în Human Rights in European Criminal law (Stefano Ruggeri, coord.), Springer, 2015, la pp. 41-42)

In their jurisprudential application the two principles (ultima ratio and proportionality) are, due to the principle of legality, restricted to a potential limitation of the punitive power of the state. However, in the creation of a penal norm, the functional role of the two principles is less clear and is dependent on philosophical assumptions related to the purpose of punishment. In that sense, necessity and proportionality can impose not only ‘less punishment’, but also ‘more punishment’, if this is needed in order to effectively protect legal goods, as well as to ensure a certain degree of ‘fairness’.
(…)
However, leaving criminal law entirely outside of this field creates problems with regard to the ordinal conception of proportionality which requires that penalties are scaled according to the comparative seriousness of crimes. Punishing simple crimes against property with several years of imprisonment and leaving unpunished – or less severely punished – unlawful conducts that create enormous benefits for the perpetrators and can lead to severe damages to the financial system as a whole creates an obvious lack of fairness, which cannot be justified on the complexity of the system. (s.n. – M.M.-B.)

Silvia Allegrezza și Ioannis Rodopoulos
(Enforcing Prudential Banking Regulations in the Eurozone: A Reading from the Viewpoint of Criminal Law în Challenges in the Field of Economic and Financial Crime in Europe and the US (K. Ligeti, V. Franssen, coord.), ed. Hart Publishing, 2017, la pp. 261-262)

To be betrayed by the courts is particularly painful to our sense of justice. In convicting the defendant Rothaug, the Senior Public Prosecutor of the People’s Court, formerly the Chief Justice of the Special Court in Nuremberg, the US Military Tribunal said:

That the number the defendant could wipe out within his competency was smaller than the number involved in the mass persecutions and exterminations by the leaders whom he served, does not mitigate his contribution to the program of those leaders. His acts were more terrible in that those who might have hoped for a last refuge in the institution of justice found these institutions turned against them and a part of the program of terror and oppresion.

(nota de subsol 13: The Justice Case (1951), pp. 1155-1156).
These words are a forceful reminder of the importance of the law and justice, not only in our normal liberal and democratic settings but not least in settings where other social institutions fail. The expectation of courts in orders based on the rule of law is that they can keep the other branches of government in check if they violate basic legal principles. This is not to say that judges and members of the legal profession are better or worse than those who occupy other roles in society. But when it comes to justice, the expectations are higher.

Hans Petter Graver
(Judges against Justice: On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack, ed. Springer, 2014, la pp. 18-19)

Non bis in idem – que certains appellent ‘ne bis in idem‘ sans qu’il ne faille y voir une quelconque différence – est un grand principe, presque mistique. Faustin Hélie, il y a presque deux cent ans déjà, disait de ce principe qu’il ‘appartient au droit universel des nations’. Traduction latine du principe de l’autorité de la chose jugée, il met en exergue ce qui devrait être une évidence: nul ne doit pouvoir être jugé et condamné deux fois à raison des mêmes faits, et a fortiori dans le domaine fondamental de la matière pénale. Mais présenté ainsi, les difficultes apparaissent déjà, tant chacune de ces notions – ‘mêmes faits’, ‘jugé’, ‘matière pénale’ – portent en soi les prémices de nombreuses difficultés d’interpretation. Car si le principe est simple, c’est précisément son interpretation par de très nombreuses juridictions – pas toujours à l’unisson – qui pose questions et explique que ce mythe est revenu sur le devant de la scène aujourd’hui.

Delphine Brach-Thiel
(Avant-Propos Non bis in idem: du mythe à la réalité în Existe-t-il encore un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui? (coord. D. Brach-Thiel), ed. L’Harmattan, 2017, la p. 1)

[Imunitatea judiciară nu este totuși universal recunoscută. În Germania, de exemplu, imunitatea judiciară nu este o apărare împotriva infracțiunii de „îndoire a legii” (Rechtsbeugung conform Codului penal, secțiunea 339 (- nota de subsol 15: s-a susținut că instanța supremă din Germania, prin intermediul unei interpretări restrictive a secțiunii 339 (anterior 336), a creat ceea ce reprezintă în practică imunitatea judiciară, vezi Spendel (1996), pp. 809-812.)

De asemenea, este interesant de observat că noțiunea de imunitate judiciară nu este parte explicită a Principiilor de bază ale ONU privind independența sistemului judiciar, și nici a Principiilor Bangalore de conduită judiciară.

Ar trebui să permitem imunitatea judiciară ca apărare pentru judecătorii acuzați de subminarea statului de drept prin aplicarea și extinderea legislației opresive și a regimurilor represive? Inima problemei este că, în cazurile în care legea este rea, noi vrem ca judecătorul să fie influențat de factori în afara legii. Legea nu este niciodată complet rațională, iar întrebările de drept și de fapt nu sunt niciodată determinate complet de aceasta. Acest aspect înseamnă că elementele de judecată, și deci de moralitate și etică, joacă și ele un rol în luarea deciziilor legale.

Vrem ca judecătorii să acționeze ca agenți morali în situații extreme și să protejeze statul de drept atunci când el este atacat. Experiența istorică arată că principala problemă cu care ne confruntăm nu este dată de judecătorii necinstiți care se abat de la lege, ci de judecătorii obedienți care, din diverse motive, contribuie la menținerea regimurilor autoritare, a legilor malefice și la erodarea statului de drept. Deoarece imunitatea judiciară nu poate fi apărată decât din perspectiva statului de drept, ea nu ar trebui construită în așa fel încât să contribuie la erodarea statului de drept. „Când judecătorii devin complici în asuprirea aplicată de stat, ei nu-și pot invoca independența ca un” obstacol insurmontabil ” în fața unei trageri la răspundere”. De fapt, imunitatea judiciară ar trebui construită astfel încât să poată favoriza apărarea statului de drept. Aceasta ar implica faptul că imunitatea judiciară nu poate fi disponibilă ca apărare a unui judecător acuzat de încălcarea unui aspect fundamental al statului de drept.]

Judicial immunity, however, is by no means universally recognized. In Germany, for instance, judicial immunity is no defence against the crime of ‘bending the law’ (Rechtsbeugung according to the Criminal Code, section 339 (- nota de subsol 15: It has been claimed that the German Supreme Court, through a restrictive interpretation and application of section 339 (previously 336), has created what amounts to judicial immunity in practice; see Spendel (1996), pp. 809-812). It is also interesting to note that the concept of judicial immunity is not made an explicit part of the UN Basic Principles on the Independent of the Judiciary or the Bangalore Principle of Judicial Conduct.
Should we allow judicial immunity as a defence for judges accused of undermining the rule of law by enforcing and expanding oppressive legislation and repressive regimes? The heart of the matter is that in cases where the law is evil, we want the judge to be influenced by factors outside the law. Law is never completely rational, and questions of law and fact are never completely determined. This means that elements of judgment, and thus morality and ethics, enter into legal decision-making. We want judges to act as moral agents in extreme situations and to protect the rule of law when it is under attack. Historical experience shows that the main problem we face is not rogue judges deviating from the law but obedient judges who, for various reasons, contribute to authoritarian regimes, evil laws, and the erosion of the rule of law. Since judicial immunity can only be defended from the perspective of the rule law, it should not be constructed in such a way that it contributes to the erosion of the rule of law. „When judges make themselves complicit in state oppression they cannot cite their independence as an ‘insurmountable obstacle’ to their being made accountable„. Rather, judicial immunity should be constructed so that it can foster the defence of the rule of law. This would entail that judicial immunity is not available as a defence to a judge who is accused of violating fundamental aspect of the rule of law.

Hans Petter Graver
(Judges against Justice: On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack, ed. Springer, 2014, la pp. 175-176)

[Judecătorul se află sub presiune atunci când legiuitorul atacă legea. Ar trebui judecătorul să aplice legi care încalcă în mod intenționat și necontenit drepturile fundamentale ale indivizilor, să îi priveze de procedurile corecte și de protecție a legii și să îi supună pedepselor draconice și disproporționate? Ar trebui să contribuie la transformarea legii într-un instrument sistematic de persecuție pe motive rasiale, politice sau de altă natură?
Mulți vor fi probabil înclinați să răspundă la întrebarea de mai sus cu un clar „nu”. Acesta este și răspunsul meu. S-ar putea spune că răspunsul este evident și nu are nevoie de o gândire mai profundă. În conformitate cu idealurile tradiției noastre juridice occidentale, judecătorii și instanțele ar trebui să fie protectorii drepturilor și libertății. În același timp, ei trebuie să respecte legea; uneori, aceste două așteptări sunt în conflict. În astfel de situații, judecătorul trebuie să aleagă dacă trebuie să se alăture legiuitorului sau să se alăture idealurilor statului de drept. Mulți judecători, atunci când întrebările au apărut în situații concrete din viața reală, au răspuns cu „da”, ei ar trebui să respecte legea. Acest lucru arată cum răspunsul nu este la fel de clar precum ne-ar plăcea să credem.
Nu numai că mulți judecători susțin legea opresivă și aplică tirania. În același timp, în multe cazuri, aceștia consideră că ei chiar apără statul de drept în timp ce execută politici diabolice. Încercarea de a arăta de ce un astfel de răspuns este greșit în timp ce vom aborda în mod serios situația judecătorilor – acesta este subiectul prezentei cărți]

The judge is under pressure when the legislator attacks the law. Should the judge enforce laws that intentionally and incessantly violate basic rights of individuals, deprive them of due process and the protection of the law, and submit them to draconic and disproportionate punishments? Should he contribute to turning the law into a systematic instrument of persecution on racial, political, or other grounds?
Many will perhaps be inclined to answer the above question with a clear „no”. This is also my answer. One might say that the answer is obvious and in no need of deeper thought. According to the ideals of our western legal tradition, judges and courts should be the protectors of rights and liberty. At the same time, they should uphold the law; sometimes these two expectations are in conflict. In such situations, the judge has to choose whether to side with the legislator or to side with the ideals of the rule of law. Many judges, when the questions have arisen in practical real-life situations, have answered yes, they should uphold the law. This show that the answer is not as clear-cut as we would like to have it.
Not only do many judges uphold oppressive law and enforce tyranny. In many cases, they at the same time believe that they are defending the rule of law as they cary out evil policies. Trying to show why this is the wrong answer while at the same time taking the situation of the judges seriously is what this book is about.

Hans Petter Graver
(Judges against Justice: On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack, ed. Springer, 2014, la p.1)

[Legea privind protecția datelor are un obiectiv clar. Scopul său este de a asigura demnitatea umană și dezvoltarea personală în societatea informațională digitală. Demnitatea umană include un spațiu de confidențialitate individuală inaccesibil publicului.

În această zonă de confidențialitate, care aparține nucleului demnității umane, o persoană este lăsată singură și se bucură de un drept la solitudine. Sfera privată este condiția necesară, dacă nu suficientă, pentru ca individul să poată dezvolta liber personalitatea sa. Fără un drept la viață privată inviolabil, personalitatea nu se poate dezvolta cu succes.

În societatea informațională digitală, o parte din personalitatea fiecăruia include și posibilitatea de a determina ce informații sunt puse la dispoziția publicului. Relațiile sociale sunt caracterizate de ceea ce oamenii știu unul despre celălalt. Dacă nu știi ce știu ceilalți și publicul despre tine, atunci ești limitat în dezvoltarea liberă a personalității tale. Incertitudinea cu privire la ceea ce știu ceilalți poate face pe unii oameni să se teamă și să fie excesiv de precauți. Din această perspectivă, protecția datelor reprezintă o altă specificare a demnității umane care ia în considerare provocările și riscurile speciale ale societății digitale a cunoașterii.]

Data protection law has a clear objective. It aims to secure human dignity and personal development in the digital information society. Human dignity includes a space of individual privacy inaccessible to the public.

In this area of privacy, which belongs to the core of human dignity, a person is left alone and enjoys a right to solitude. The private sphere is the necessary if not sufficient condition for the individual being able to freely develop his personality. Without inviolable privacy, the personality cannot develop successfully.

In the digital information society, part of one’s personality also includes being able to determine what information is made available to the public. Social relationships are characterized by what people know about each other. If you do not know what others and the public know about you, then you are restricted in the free development of your personality. The insecurity about what others know can make people afraid and overcautious. From this perspective, data protection is a further specification of human dignity that takes into consideration the special challenges and risks of the digital knowledge society.

Volker Boehme-Neßler
(Privacy: a matter of democracy. Why democracy needs privacy and data protection, International Data Privacy Law, 2016, Vol. 6, Nr. 3, la pp. 223-224)